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WHO’S AFRAID OF UBER?
Jeremy Kidd, J.D., Ph.D.*
Ride-sharing has disrupted the transportation-for-hire industry, breaking
down barriers to entry that have protected entrenched incumbents for decades.
The disruption has led to calls for increased regulation, along with criticisms
about the effect of innovation on consumer safety, market stability, rule of law,
and other areas. That disruption, however, has also led to tremendous benefits to
consumers as they are freed from a regulatory regime that limited their transportation choices and forced them to pay higher prices for lower quality service. The
same type of disruptive innovation is upon us in almost every area of our economy. How we deal with it will determine whether the law will finally free consumers from the grasp of entrenched and privileged incumbents or whether the combined forces of those incumbents and their erstwhile allies in academia will lead
to a regulatory retrenchment. The Article concludes that opposition to innovation
rests on a Galbraithian foundation that holds a dim view of human nature.
Greater reliance on Smithian assumptions would serve us better as we decide
how to deal with innovation and its disruption. The Article also concludes that
innovation is inevitable; if the law seeks to inhibit it, it merely guarantees a
greater disruption when it finally arrives.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 14, 2018, the New York City Council froze all new for-hirevehicle licensing for one year.1 Given that the number of taxi licenses, or medallions, is already fixed, the practical effect of the law is to freeze the ability
of ride-sharing companies—also known as Transportation Network Companies,
or TNCs—to expand in the city. A cursory glance past the accepted rationale of
the ordinance—to provide “breathing room” to investigate the impact that forhire vehicles have on the city2—reveals little more than legislative power being
wielded for the benefit of the powerful taxi industry. Having enjoyed strong legal protections for almost a century, the combined taxi cartel now finds itself
ceding market power to TNCs, and it is flexing its muscles to protect its privileges.
Legal barriers similar to those protecting taxis from competition exist in
many areas of the economy, but wave after wave of innovation has begun to
erode the legislative and regulatory walls that allow favored incumbents to
wield monopoly power. Legal scholarship has begun to grapple with regulation-innovation conflict in the financial sphere3 but has not yet applied the same
focused lens on other areas in the economy. To be certain, some commentators
1

N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 147 (Aug. 14, 2018).
E.g., Deepti Hajela & Karen Matthews, NYC Considers One-Year Cap on Licenses for
New Ride-Hail Cars, MEETINGS & CONVENTIONS (Aug. 8, 2018), http://www.meetings-con
ventions.com/News/Transportation/New-York-CIty-Lyft-Uber-regulations/ [https://perm
a.cc/5XPX-R58R].
3 E.g., Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of
Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 6–7 (2018); Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization
on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 131 (2017); Seth C. Oranburg,
Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and the Market for Entrepreneurial Finance, 25 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 399 (2015).
2
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have weighed in on what they see as potential dangers arising from innovation
and the perceived need for regulation. These regulations are presented as necessary to protect consumers and a host of other interests,4 but there is a striking
lack of attention paid to the costs of attempting to protect society from the effects of innovation.
This Article fills that gap, using the battle between TNCs and the taxi industry as a case study. As a first step, Part I will describe the forces that led cities to regulate the taxi industry in the first place. A wave of innovation in the
early twentieth century changed the face of transportation in large cities and
forced lawmakers to consider ways to address the perceived flaws in transportation markets.5 One plausible solution was a cap on the number of taxis, which
would serve to limit traffic congestion and raise wages for taxi drivers. Those
goals were achieved, but at a terrible cost to consumers, drivers, and the broader society.
Part II will describe the costs of choosing the path of restrictive regulations. Creating barriers to entry provides an immediate windfall to those fortunate enough to find themselves inside when the walls are erected, but the benefits dissipate rapidly through rising costs of entrance into the market. Given
strong limits on total participation, new entrants must buy out existing participants and, while entrants are willing to pay for the right to extract governmentsanctioned monopoly profits, the entry price eventually swallows most or all of
those profits. As a result, those who pay the higher cost of admission spend
their time desperately seeking to avoid losing all that was spent to enter the
market rather than defending continued windfalls.
All the while, consumers are exploited by having to pay higher prices for
lower quality services—not to mention having fewer options—than they would
have in an innovative, competitive market.6 Part III shows how TNCs and other
disruptive innovators can render moot existing barriers to entry, liberating consumers and, in some cases, producers who have been trapped in inefficient
modes of operation. In response to that disruption, and without a trace of irony,
consumer “protection” arguments are employed in defense of the regimes that
empower incumbents’ exploiting of consumers.7 These arguments are not offered directly by the incumbents but by consumer advocates who are willing to
stand athwart the tide of innovation and shout “no more.” Because innovation
poses an existential threat, not to consumers but to the protected industry and

4

E.g., Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1670–71 (2017).
5 See infra Section I.B.
6 See Judd Cramer & Alan B. Krueger, Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of
Uber, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 177 (2016).
7 E.g., Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65
UCLA L. REV. 232, 250 (2018).
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the consumer exploitation it represents,8 those producers privileged by government must oppose innovation and the freedom it offers consumers.
Part IV will show how the list of those protected by government barriers to
competition in transportation markets goes beyond taxi drivers and taxi companies to encompass the financial institutions who provide capital to pay the high
fixed costs of entry. Part V then offers suggestions for how the law should approach innovation and the disruption that comes with it, using ride-sharing versus taxis as a cautionary tale. Bringing together the lessons learned from the
history of point-to-point transportation, Part V will show that seeking to tame
markets inevitably harms consumers while benefitting wealthy, politically connected industry incumbents. More importantly, when lawmakers choose to
erect barriers to competition and innovation, they impede the natural evolution
of markets and set the stage for more profound disruption when innovation is
finally able to escape the constraints placed on it by lawmakers. By refusing to
erect barriers to competition, lawmakers will invite smaller, more manageable
disruption that occurs continually in competitive markets.
I.

A TALE OF TRANSPORTATION MARKETS

TNCs are the most recent player to make an appearance on a stage that
goes back as far as people have needed to travel. In order to understand how we
got here and how we might progress into the future, this Part will offer a brief
sketch of transportation markets with particular emphasis on the market forces
that drive consumers and producers of transportation services. Part of that discussion must include the ways in which markets might perform sub-optimally.
This Part will describe the regulatory actions taken by local governments in response to perceived market imperfections, the traditional arguments in favor of
those government interventions, and why the diagnosis that led to those policy
choices may have been flawed.
A. The Economics of Transportation
1. Supply and Demand
Getting from point A to point B has never been easy, whether accomplished under one’s own power or by purchasing transportation services in the
aptly named point-to-point transportation market. As technology advances, individuals are less likely to rely solely on their own physical capacity, but those
advances in transportation services cost something to produce. Prior to the industrial revolution, for example, you could avoid walking if you could find an
animal to carry you, but that animal needed food, shelter, and other care in order to be healthy enough to provide transportation services. Industrial modes of
8

See, e.g., Jeremy Kidd, Fintech: Antidote to Rent-Seeking?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 165,
176 (2018).
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transportation also needed food (fossil fuels, for example), shelter (parking),
and other forms of maintenance. Modern transportation has the same production costs associated with it, and those costs of production are the primary determinant of supply; as production costs decline, we can produce more and different kinds of transportation at current prices. By the same mechanism, higher
prices mean that we can afford to produce more transportation at current production costs.9 These facts are represented in what economists call the Law of
Supply, that the amount of any good or service (including transportation) increases as prices increase.10
Demand for transportation services also evolves over time, yet follows
similar, recognizable patterns even as the details change. Primarily, individuals
need transportation to obtain the various things they need and want. For most of
human history, for example, that meant moving to stave off starvation and/or
avoid other modes of death. As individuals rise above a subsistence state,
transportation also becomes a means to obtain goods and services that aren’t
essential for survival but are desired for improving quality of life.11 When the
things we desire are close at hand, our demand for transportation services will
remain low. As more and more desirable things are available only at other locations, we increase our demand for transportation in order to obtain those things.
Transportation is therefore what economists call a complementary good—a
good that is used in tandem with another—for any good that exists outside of
an individual’s immediate surroundings.12
Demand for transportation responds to a number of factors, apart from our
general preferences for things outside of our current surroundings. One of the

9

To those not familiar with economic terminology, these two sentences may seem contradictory, but they are not. To see why, imagine the following examples. Farmer A suddenly
discovers a new, less expensive fertilizer that reduces the cost of producing each bushel of
grain by $1. Farmer A can produce the same level of output for less, leaving resources available that Farmer A can use to produce additional grain, even if market prices—those paid by
consumers—have not changed. Farmer B, on the other hand, has seen the market price for
his corn rise by $1 per bushel. Farmer B will receive greater revenues for selling the same
output, providing an expectation of additional resources that Farmer B can use to produce
additional grain, even if production costs have not changed. Of course, the traditional economic models—with increasing marginal costs—make a more accurate calculation of output
and profits more complicated, but the basic conclusions from these simple examples are still
valid.
10 JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 12–15 (5th ed. 2011).
11 See ACCESS DEV., NATIONAL CONSUMER STUDY SUMMARY: THE IMPACT OF RETAIL
PROXIMITY ON CONSUMER PURCHASES 7 (2016–17), https://ww2.accessdevelopment.com/
hubfs/Access_Consumer_Spend_Research_Study_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQH3-HBFC]
(last visited Jan. 29, 2020).
12 Some economists go one step further, arguing that transportation is “a friction . . . that
must be incurred by individuals and firms to complete almost any market transaction.”
Clifford Winston, On the Performance of the U.S. Transportation System: Caution Ahead,
51 J. ECON. LIT. 773, 773 (2013).

20 NEV. L.J. 581

586

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

most important is an individual’s income.13 As incomes rise, mere survival becomes less of an immediate concern.14 Individuals begin expanding their consumption choices to the things that increase happiness and satisfaction, not just
those things that sustain life.15 The higher the income, the more broad-ranging
that list becomes and the more likely an individual will choose to hire transportation services in order to obtain them.16 Rising incomes should therefore increase the total demand for transportation.17 Falling incomes push people towards subsistence and make them more likely to be conservative in their
consumption choices.18 For example, many individuals will be more likely to
choose local goods rather than expend resources on transportation to access
more distant substitutes.19
A change in income might also change what type of transportation an individual chooses to purchase, and there are many options. The market for transportation can be thought of in broad terms, but that broad market is also divisible into a number of smaller segments. One possible example is the subdivision
illustrated in Figure 1. If, for the purpose of this discussion, we define “transportation” as moving people or goods from one place to another, we can think
of dividing that market into whether goods or people are moved—whether we
are transporting individuals to the goods they want or transporting the goods to
them. The former would include things like walking, driving, riding public
transportation, etc. The latter would include things like cargo ships, trains, bigrig trucking, and so on, but might also include personal pick-up trucks in rural
areas. Each of those sub-categories can be further subdivided, and one of those
subdivisions is particularly relevant to the present discussion. Transportation of
people to the goods and services they desire can be divided into personal transportation, public transportation, and commercial, point-to-point transportation.
13

Obviously, there are many for whom these concerns are more pressing. The point is not to
diminish the reality of those concerns for individuals who are close to subsistence level but
to note what happens to those who rise above that level.
14 See David R. Henderson, Demand, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/libr
ary/Enc/Demand.html [https://perma.cc/LW3C-S3SE] (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (“It is not
just price that affects the quantity demanded. Income affects it too. As real income rises,
people buy more of some goods (which economists call ‘normal goods’) and less of others
(called ‘inferior goods’).”).
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 Certain forms of transportation are considered inferior goods, meaning that rising incomes
should lead to a decrease in demand. See id. Overall, however, demand for transportation
services should rise with incomes.
18 The closer someone is to starvation, the less willing they will be to spend any of their limited resources on non-essential amenities.
19 Even if Honeycrisp apples (grown in New York and New England) are accepted as having “set themselves apart from other apples,” HONEYCRISP.COM, https://honeycrisp.com/hon
eycrisp_apple.html [https://perma.cc/M56V-BJUR] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020), a poor family
will likely choose more bland red-delicious apples because doing so leaves more income to
be spent on other foods or other necessities.
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The first is people transporting themselves by means they own or control, typically by car but also by bike, motorcycle, boat, airplane, etc. The second is paying a municipality or third-party contractor to use the public transportation system (subways, bus systems, trolleys, etc.). The third is people paying a thirdparty for transport services or point-to-point transportation. Historically, you
could hire a carriage for this purpose, but those were almost entirely replaced
by buses, trains and, of course, taxi cabs. TNCs fall into this subsector of the
market.
FIGURE 1

All forms of transportation are, to some extent, substitutes.20 For example,
if individuals want a particular good that is not currently in their homes, they
can either pay someone to transport the good to their home or transport themselves to the good. If the choice is self-transport, they can choose between a
mode of transport that they own and control, or they can hire someone to
transport them. For every good that we purchase, it is likely that a combination
of forms has been used, such as when goods are transported as far as a local
store and the consumer transported herself to the store. Because individuals
have finite budgets,21 the relative prices of the various forms of transport will
factor heavily into the decision of which form to employ. The negative relationship between price and quantity purchased is what economists call the Law
of Demand.22 All consumers will also base their choices on non-price factors,

20

Substitute goods are those that can be used in place of each other. See WALTER
NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND
EXTENSIONS 184–85 (12th ed. 2017).
21 Even the wealthiest individuals have finite budgets, although the constraints imposed by
those budgets are significantly less binding than those of more modest means.
22
Henderson, supra note 14.

20 NEV. L.J. 581

588

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

such as aesthetics, convenience, and other amenities.23 As incomes rise, those
non-price factors will become more important.24
If the price of a particular form of transportation is relatively high, there
will be few consumers demanding that form of transportation, but more producers will be willing to supply that form.25 Relatively low prices will result in
a large number of consumers demanding transportation of that form, but producers will be unable or unwilling to provide that transportation at that price,
creating a shortage.26 One of the fundamental truths of economics is that
“[p]eople respond to incentives,”27 and either a shortage or a glut (prices too
high) will create powerful incentives. With a shortage, there will be a lot of eager consumers; some enterprising individual will raise the price just a little and
capture the extra profits that are represented by consumers standing around, unable to get where they need to go.28 That single entrepreneur’s actions will signal to others that extra profits can be made if the price is raised, leading to rising prices and an elimination of the shortage.29 By the same token, when there
is a glut, sellers will have lots of unused capacity—either buses that run half23

Consumers choose goods and services based on a combination of price and quality, with
“quality” embodying these amenities. One example that has recently gained notoriety is consumers’ lower preference for ugly produce. See Is “Ugly Produce” the Key to Our Food
Waste Problem?, CBS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ugly-producethe-key-to-our-food-waste-problem/ [https://perma.cc/5LKJ-RKUM].
24 Rising incomes allow consumers to select higher quality goods because price becomes a
less-binding constraint. E.g., Mark Pauly, The Tax Subsidy to Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Distribution of Well-Being, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 99 (2006)
(“[L]ower-wage workers, in an effort to limit the amount of increase in their real income going to medical care, would choose policies that limit cost by providing smaller amounts of
new technology; on the other hand, higher-wage workers would be more able and willing to
devote more of their income to new medical care, preferring to invest more in higher-quality
care.”).
25 This is nothing more than the Law of Supply. E.g., William A. Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corporate Inventors to Sell Patents, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1045, 1066 n.88 (2004); Robert M. Hardaway, Taxi and Limousines: The Last Bastion of
Economic Regulation, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL’Y 319, 352 (2000).
26 See, e.g., Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib
.org/library/Enc/PriceControls.html [https://perma.cc/VFB2-DN3Z] (last visited Jan. 29,
2020) (explaining the shortage caused when government price controls prohibit relatively
low prices from rising in response to market forces).
27 STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST: ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3
(rev. ed. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28 E.g., James M. Koelemay, Jr., Case Note, Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290
(7th Cir. 1974), 53 TEX. L. REV. 551, 555 (1975) (“[A] shortage would not reduce the number of suppliers reasonably available to Mullis, but would simply cause prices to rise, allowing Mullis to obtain a supplier by offering a higher price.”).
29 Russell S. Sobel, Entrepreneurship, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/
library/Enc/Entrepreneurship.html [https://perma.cc/KKZ7-XAZD] (last visited Jan. 24,
2020) (explaining the Kirznerian entrepreneur as one who “discovers previously unnoticed
profit opportunities” and triggers “a process in which these newly discovered profit opportunities are then acted on in the marketplace until market COMPETITION eliminates the profit
opportunity”) (alteration in original).
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empty, or cabs that sit idle all day, or car lots that have too many of last year’s
models.30 To avoid the costs of having idle capacity, an enterprising seller will
lower prices and begin to gain profits from utilizing her excess.31 That will be a
signal to some other sellers to do the same and to high-cost sellers to get out of
the market.32 As a result, prices will fall and the glut will go away.33
2. Market Perfection and Imperfection
These market forces work on their own, without any specific direction by
government agents; millions of independent producers and consumers just respond to the prices in the market and, by doing so, create tomorrow’s prices.34
Those prices cause a new round of reactions and further price changes until, in
theory, the market reaches a point where the amount demanded by consumers
is exactly the same as the amount supplied, and everyone is happy.35 In the absence of any distortions, the point-to-point transportation market could be left
alone and price and quantity would fluctuate as the factors of supply and demand fluctuate.36 Combined with competition between producers, market forces would yield a variety of transportation options at prices that consumers could
afford.
Unfortunately, we do not live in a world without distortions, so the market
for transportation may not function as well as desired.37 One way that a market
30

Surpluses exist in many markets, when supply outpaces demand. E.g., Ryosuke Kojima,
The Influenza Vaccine Market: From Shortage to Surplus, 14 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 33, 33
(2009) (describing “millions of doses of influenza vaccine [that] remain unsold” every year).
In the market for transportation services, the shortage is not vaccines sitting around on
shelves, but transportation options—personal cars, taxis, etc.—sitting around on streets, in
garages, or in parking lots.
31 See Sobel, supra note 29.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See generally LEONARD E. READ, I, PENCIL: MY FAMILY TREE AS TOLD TO LEONARD E.
READ (1958), available at https://fee.org/resources/i-pencil/ [https://perma.cc/SY3S-SUNC].
35 Economists refer to this point as “market equilibrium.” See HARRISON, supra note 10, at
15–17.
36 The standard assumption of economic models is ceteris paribus, that all things remain
constant. In an unchanging world, the market would reach and maintain a stable equilibrium
price and quantity. F.A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Process, 5 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON.
9, 15 (2002) (“[T]rue equilibrium presupposes that the relevant facts have already been discovered and that the process of competition has thus come to an end.”). The world we actually live in, of course, is anything but unchanging; even if the market could reach equilibrium,
it would only stay there for the briefest of instants—perhaps only seconds—before changing
circumstances would force price and quantity to change. Equilibrium, then, should be understood as a point of attraction, towards which market forces move price and quantity, rather
than an obtainable result. See generally READ, supra note 34.
37 Of course, falling short of perfection does not mean that the market is incurably flawed.
Rather, it means exactly what it sounds like, that it falls somewhere short of perfection. It
may be a small divergence from the ideal outcome, or it may be a major divergence, and only further investigation will reveal whether or not the divergence is sufficiently large as to
destroy confidence in the ability of the market to produce beneficial results.
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may be distorted is through the presence of externalities, negative or positive.38
An externality occurs when someone outside of the transaction is affected by
the transaction.39 If the externality is negative, then the parties to the transaction
can shift some of the cost onto innocent bystanders.40 As a result, the market
price will be too low, and more of that good or service will be produced than is
ideal.41 Any form of transportation that emits exhaust will impose this type of
spillover cost, as anyone nearby will breathe in the exhaust, regardless of
whether they received transportation services.42 If the externality is positive,
then bystanders receive a partial benefit from a transaction they had no role in
generating, resulting in a price that is too high and a quantity that is too low.43
Other distortions may involve excessive market power,44 imperfect information
or information asymmetries,45 or high transaction costs.46 Importantly, while
these distortions are often referred to as “market failures,” and used to justify
government regulation of the industry, they can just as easily be the result of
direct government action and, in that case, should be called “government failures.”47
38

See R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 23 (1988).
Id. at 23–24.
40 See id. at 24.
41 E.g., Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2011) (“A
party may have an incentive to engage in an activity if the activity’s private benefits exceed
its private costs even though, as a result of the externality, the activity is undesirable as its
social costs exceed its social benefits.”).
42 Lincoln L. Davies, Energy, Consumption, and the Amorality of Energy Law, 109 AJIL
UNBOUND 147, 149 (2015) (“Nor does the individual starting the car feel the full consequences of that decision. They do not breathe the exhaust, or taste the water contaminated by
the oil spill, or feel the pain of the sage grouse displaced by the extraction well pad, even
though that chain of events is put in motion every time they push the gas pedal.”).
43 See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J. Legal Stud. 21, 22 (2009)
(“[N]egative externalities result in oversupply of some dangerous activities, while positive
externalities result in undersupply of some beneficial ones.”).
44 See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 77, 112 (“Presumably, the less restrictive alternative requirement, if properly enforced,
will induce firms to achieve cognizable benefits without simultaneously creating or exercising market power, thus defeating a market failure and maximizing the welfare of consumers.”).
45 Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1,
33 (2016) (“[I]nformation asymmetry, often found in markets for services, can lead to a
market failure that results in too-low quality products, leaving consumers who demand—and
are willing to pay for—high quality services without any options.”).
46 Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case for a
Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579, 605 (2005)
(“[E]xcessive transaction costs and positive externalities create a bottleneck or market failure
. . . .”). For a simple explanation of the transaction cost concept, see Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 144–45 (2014).
47 E.g., Jeremy Kidd & Joseph R. Padgett, Trucker Shortage as Government Failure, 1 LOY.
U. CHI. J. REG. COMPLIANCE 7, 10–11 (2016). For the general argument about governmentcreated “failures” in the market, see R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 28 (1960); Kidd, supra note 46, at 149–51.
39
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B. Evolution of the Modern Taxi
At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, two factors changed the face of
urban America in a way that gave rise to the taxi industry. The first was rapidly
rising population density.48 The second was the advent of affordable automobiles, subject to constant improvements.49 As population density rose and people began to crowd out agricultural space and even some manufacturing space,
people needed to travel more to obtain the things they needed. Cars also became much cheaper to buy during this time period,50 which would normally result in more car ownership, but the rise in population density also made it far
more costly to keep a car in the city, as parking became relatively more
scarce.51 Cities needed a new version of an old form of transportation, and cars
quickly replaced horse-drawn carriages in the early years of the Twentieth Century;52 most cabbies likely switched to cars, remaining part of the point-to-point
transportation industry.
As a concept, taxis had much to recommend them. A personal vehicle usually spends a good deal of the day idle, which makes it relatively costly. However, it also offers the immediate convenience of travel to wherever the owner
wishes to go, assuming there are roads. As keeping a car became more expensive, some entrepreneurial individuals likely noticed that the cost of maintaining a car was not prohibitive if it were possible to use the car to generate revenue by keeping the car busy doing what it does best—provide transportation
services. Cities were, at this time, building other forms of public transport,53 but
48

For example, New York City went from a population of 3,427,202 in 1900 to 6,930,446
in 1930, an increase of 102.2%; Chicago, during the same time period, went from a population of 1,698,575 to 3,376,438 in 1930, an increase of 98.8%. Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/ [https://
perma.cc/T99S-LEWV] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
49 See Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 34–35 (2003) (describing the rapid pace of innovation at Ford Motor Company in the first two decades of the
Twentieth Century, which made Ford’s cars cheaper and better).
50 Id.
51
Even the same number of parking spaces would not suffice to handle all the automobiles
brought by new residents.
52 GREGORY DROZDZ, CAB AND COACH 25–26 (1990).
53 The first elevated railway in New York City, the IRT Ninth Avenue Line, opened July 3,
1868, followed by other elevated lines and, on October 27, 1904, the first underground line.
James Nevius, The Elevated Era, CURBED N.Y. (June 27, 2018), https://ny.curbed.com
/2018/6/27/17507424/new-york-city-elevated-train-history-transportation [https://perma
.cc/4JLA-HB57]; New York City Subway Opens, HISTORY (last updated Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/new-york-city-subway-opens [https://perma.cc
/3XR5-LXT3]. The lines were built by the city and leased to private companies to operate.
See New Subways for New York: The Dual System of Rapid Transit (1913),
https://www.nycsubway.org/wiki/Chapter_1:_Dual_System_of_Rapid_Transit [https://perm
a.cc/CF3R-6E4H] (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). Chicago’s “L” first opened for business on
June 6, 1892, and the first full circuit of the Loop was finished in 1897. The Chicago L, CHI.
ARCHITECTURE CTR., http://www.architecture.org/learn/resources/buildings-of-chicago/buil
ding/the-chicago-l/ [https://perma.cc/AR3A-MZ3S] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
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bus routes and subway systems have fixed points for pick-up and drop-off,
making them less convenient than a car that could pick you up at your home
and drop you off at your desired location.
The problem with this development, as exemplified in the case of New
York City, was that the incentives to join the ranks of for-hire cabbies were,
perhaps, too great.54 Recall that this was an entirely new market or, at least, a
complete renovation of the old for-hire carriage market with automobiles. The
opening of this market would have appeared to be like the economic equivalent
to the Oklahoma land rush,55 with tremendous opportunity for those who got in
early. The result was a large number of early entrants,56 and the seeming overabundance of supply in the point-to-point transportation market led many cabbies to complain that the wages were not sufficient to compensate for the time
and cost of being a cabbie.57
Faced with these concerns, early Twentieth Century policy makers faced
the same difficult decision as faces policy makers today—whether to intervene.
Refraining from regulation is so infrequently on the menu that it can be difficult to remember that government regulation is not the only way market conditions change. In the case of taxi drivers and their complaints, it is important to
point out that sellers in every market are likely to complain when they have too
much competition that it makes it impossible for the complainants to earn a
“proper” living. It is human nature to want more money for less work, and cabbies of the early Twentieth Century would not have been immune. One possible
policy response, therefore, would be to do nothing and allow market selfregulation to occur. The glut of point-to-point transportation service providers
would have led to some cabbies reducing their fares in an attempt to reduce excess capacity—their idle time. That reduction would lead those who had given
up the highest-valued alternative forms of employment58 to stop being cabbies
and would have incentivized more consumers to take a cab. Over time, quantity
demanded would have risen and quantity supplied would have declined, reducing the glut.
54

See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: The
Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 77 (1996) (“While fewer people could afford to ride a taxi, the number of taxicabs skyrocketed . . . . Capacity and demand were moving in opposite directions.”).
55 See Land Run of 1889, OKLA. HISTORICAL SOC’Y, https://www.okhistory.org/publications/
enc/entry.php?entry=LA014 [https://perma.cc/M5B8-UPBN] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
56 PRICE WATERHOUSE, ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB DEREGULATION & RE-REGULATION 4 (1993)
(“In an unregulated environment, the low cost of entry attracts individuals who have limited
employment options. Thus, during periods of high unemployment [like the Great Depression], independent taxi operators flood the market.”); see also Dempsey, supra note 54, at
77.
57 “Cut-throat competition in a business of this kind always produces chaos. Drivers are
working as long as sixteen hours per day, in their desperate efforts to eke out a living.”
Dempsey, supra note 54, at 77 (quoting Taxicab Chaos, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 1933)).
58 In economic terms, those with the highest opportunity costs. Armen A. Alchian, Cost, in 3
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 404 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
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Cities did not take that path, instead turning to regulatory interventions to
“fix” excess supply and too-low prices. Most large cities imposed firm limits
on the number of taxis that were allowed to operate in the city.59 The typical
regulatory form was to implement a medallion system, where a certain number
of medallions were sold, and anyone attempting to operate a taxi without a medallion was subject to penalties.60 Over the years, most cities have abandoned
their medallion systems, but other methods of controlling supply have been
tried.61 In some cities, for example, all taxi drivers must work for one of a small
number of licensed taxi companies.62 Even setting aside the potential for exploitation of drivers, such a regime grants oligopolistic power to the favored
taxi companies, allowing them to restrict supply in order to maintain higher
prices.63 Even in cities where express limits on supply have not been implemented, there are often rigid price controls, in the form of detailed fare schedules, which continue to this day.64
C. Correcting Externalities
If point-to-point transportation markets work reasonably well, these government interventions would serve only to create barriers to competition. Put
another way, government attempts at “fixing” these alleged problems might
have exacerbated them or caused entirely new problems. A defense of these interventions is likely to center on the need to minimize harms arising from the
market, such as pollution or congestion from additional vehicles on the roads.65
If negative externalities exist, government intervention might be able to facilitate more efficient market outcomes. The defining characteristic of a negative
externality is that there are costs that should be, but are not, considered when
individuals choose to enter transactions.66 As a result, the market yields higher
59

HARA ASSOCS., INC., TAXICAB REGULATION IN NORTH AMERICA 6–11 (2012), available at
https://studylib.net/doc/5920613/hara-associates---taxicab-regulation-in-north-america-doc
[https://perma.cc/ZP5J-FWVS].
60 See id. at 6, 10–11.
61 Id. at 17–27.
62 Id. at 45 (describing Los Angeles’ “franchise” system, where companies bid for exclusive
service rights to particular areas of the city).
63 Oligopoly is a variation on monopoly, where a single producer has significant control
over price. George J. Stigler, Monopoly, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/
library/Enc/Monopoly.html [https://perma.cc/4W3J-5PQ7] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). An
oligopoly differs from a monopoly only in the number of suppliers in the market but, if the
numbers are small enough and the existing participants are protected from new competitors,
they can jointly act like a monopoly. See id.
64 E.g., Department of For-Hire Vehicles, DC.GOV, https://dfhv.dc.gov/page/taxicab-fares
[https://perma.cc/H366-2LQW] (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).
65 Congestion, of course, is a function of many different factors, including the choices by
government officials regarding the capacity of roads and mass transit options. See, e.g., Winston, supra note 12, at 784–86.
66 Any discussion of externalities should at least mention the critiques of externality theory
raised by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase, who argued that even the terminology presumes
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total quantity and lower price than the socially optimal outcome, an outcome
consistent with the circumstances at the beginning of the taxi industry.67 Government intervention might therefore prevent transactions that are a net drain
on society.
The negative-externality story is plausible, but is undercut by the possibility of positive externalities, and the solution imposed by municipalities is fundamentally flawed so that it likely made things worse. First, a negative externality would lead to too many cabs on the roads and prices that were not high
enough.68 A positive externality—in this case, each taxi can replace more than
a single car, and may replace dozens of cars, reducing congestion on the roads
and in parking—would result in both output and price being too low. A positive
externality operates in similar fashion to a negative externality, but with the total benefit to society being greater than the benefit to the individual.69 As a result, individuals don’t enter into transactions that would, on net, be beneficial to
society.
To combine the two concepts, a negative externality leads to higher social
costs while a positive externality leads to higher social benefits. It is therefore
possible that the extra costs of taxis are more than offset by the extra benefits of
taxis. Similarly, a negative externality leads to inefficiently high production and
consumption, while a positive externality leads to inefficiently low production.
Whether the total quantity is too high or too low depends on the magnitudes of
the externalities, and there is no reason to conclude, a priori, that limiting the
number of taxis is needed to avoid excessive social costs.
Figure 2 demonstrates how the presence of a positive externality alters the
traditional analysis of negative externalities in the taxi industry, pre-regulation.
In an unrestricted market with no externality, price and quantity measures
would move towards the point where demand (D1) = supply (S1). At that point,
quantity (q+) is greater than would be expected if the parties bore all the costs
of their transaction (q*), and price (p+) is lower than would be expected with all
costs considered (p*). The shaded triangle represents the total extra cost imposed on society from these transactions,70 and government intervention might
be justified to avoid these costs.
rather than proves the existence of a wrongdoer and a victim. Coase, supra note 47, at 2. Instead, Coase argued that a search for solutions should include a willingness to have the “victim” change its behavior, if doing so would minimize the cost of a solution. Id. at 2–6.
67 See, e.g., id. at 3–4.
68 Although, notice that the reason price should be higher is that it needs to cover all the
costs. One of the primary ways in which governments combat negative externalities is to tax
transactions in which they arise. A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 224 (4th ed.
1932). That means that “solving” a negative externality would likely not have satisfied cabbies, as it would not have increased their wages.
69 See Bryan Caplan, Externalities, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/
library/Enc/Externalities.html [https://perma.cc/SA8R-LQCB] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
70 To be clear, each transaction to the left of q* has a greater benefit (represented by the
marginal benefit (demand) curve) than the total cost (represented by S2, the societal marginal
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FIGURE 2
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A contemporaneous positive externality means that there are also social
benefits that are not captured by the individual consumer, so we include D2 to
represent the social marginal benefit (demand) curve. The socially optimal level of output is now q+, rather than q*, and the shaded rectangle no longer represents socially costly transactions because the total value of the transactions is
greater than the total cost. Negative externalities reduce social welfare and
positive externalities increase it. The net effect in the presence of both positive
and negative externalities will depend on their relative magnitudes, but it is
possible for the socially desirable outcome to be more taxis, not fewer.
Moreover, even if the market were imperfect, there would be no guarantee
that resulting government intervention would not be worse.71 In every case of a
negative externality, the primary difficulty that arises with government intervention is choosing the “correct” level of output.72 Deriving the necessary supply and demand curves is largely beyond our analytical capabilities,73 to say
nothing of the difficulty—if not impossibility—of predicting the complex hu-

cost (supply) curve). Between q* and q+, the private cost of the transaction (represented by
S1, the private marginal cost (supply) curve) is still less than the benefit and, because marginal benefits are falling and marginal costs are rising, the excess burden on society increases with every transaction past q*.
71 E.g., Kidd, supra note 46, at 153 (“Greater obstacles [to efficient markets] will mean
greater imperfections from voluntary bargains, but also that any mistakes made during government interventions will be harder to undo, so the harm to individuals and to society will
be far more lasting.”); Kidd & Padgett, supra note 47, at 16–19 (describing the problems
caused by federal trucking regulation).
72 See Caplan, supra note 69.
73
See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77–91 (1980).
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man interactions that are foundational to any such calculation.74 Notwithstanding the ongoing effort by market actors to predict present or future demand,
there is no such thing as a real-world supply or demand curve. And yet, regulators would need to set the right number of taxi medallions. Regulators would
also need to properly measure the cost of the externality—a complex task but at
least within the realm of possibility.75
One possible response is that any reduction in output would be beneficial
even if it doesn’t fully eliminate the waste. That ignores the possibility of positive externalities, as well as the likelihood that regulators will overshoot, rather
than undershoot, in their reductive efforts. If regulators set the number of taxi
medallions where quantity will be less than the socially optimum level, there is
another set of costs to deal with. Consumers and producers are willing to enter
into transactions that do no harm to anyone else but are prohibited from doing
so for no reason other than that government regulators were off in their calculations. Even worse, governments move slowly and deliberately, while markets
are dynamic and constantly changing.76 Therefore, even if regulators were
lucky enough to get the number of taxi medallions correct at the outset, that
lucky guess would not be durable, likely becoming an inefficient level of output within days or hours. Fluctuations in the market would guarantee that the
mandated level of output is wrong, possibly catastrophically wrong. For example, issuing too few medallions could result in consumers being stranded at
times without access to transportation, increasing the chance that they will become the victims of crime.77
D. Transaction Costs
Alternatively, one might argue that the real problem was one of transaction
costs. As proposed initially by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase,78 and expanded
74

Id. at 84, 91; see also LUDVIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGIC
ANALYSIS 97–105 (J. Kahane trans., 1981).
75 For example, regulators have been attempting to calculate the “social cost of carbon,” one
way of representing the optimal price of greenhouse gas emissions and, indirectly, the cost of
the externality. See William Pizer et al., Using and Improving the Social Cost of Carbon,
346 SCIENCE 1189, 1189–90 (2014). But see Julian Morris, Climate Change, Catastrophe,
Regulation and the Social Cost of Carbon, REASON FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://reason.
org/policy-study/climate-change-catastrophe-regulation-and-the-social-cost-of-carbon/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/QP5A-U5MP] (describing perceived flaws in the methodology).
76 See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 60, 61, 70–73, 81–82 (1997) (describing an
Austrian approach toward market equilibrium).
77 E.g., Woman Fatally Shot While Waiting for Taxi in Inglewood; Manhunt Underway,
ABC7 (Sept. 21, 2017), https://abc7.com/woman-in-inglewood-shot-dead-while-waiting-fortaxi/2438876/ [https://perma.cc/2JGT-MWJJ].
78 R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27 n.54 (1959)
(“[T]he legal delimitation of rights provides the starting point for the rearrangement of rights
through market transactions. Such transactions are not costless, with a result that the initial
delimitation of rights may be maintained even though some other would be more efficient.”).
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in economic literature,79 transaction costs are often the source of market inefficiencies, and reducing them may solve the market inefficiency.80 One possible
explanation for the overabundance of taxis in New York streets and elsewhere
is that, in the early Twentieth Century, it was difficult to connect someone desiring a ride with someone who operated a cab.81 Telephone service existed in a
much more limited fashion than today, so calling for a taxi would have been
difficult. Moreover, the citizens band (CB) radio had not yet been invented,82
so even if you could easily call for a taxi, the taxi would have to remain stationary, waiting for an assignment. That would lead to a tremendous amount of
down time, when the taxi driver was not making money. The only efficient way
of obtaining a fare and making a living would be to drive around, hoping to be
hailed. The costs of connecting willing drivers with willing riders were high
enough that an inefficiently high number of taxis would have been on the road
in order to satisfy the demand for taxi rides. The high number of taxis also
meant a high level of competition, so taxi drivers would have found it difficult
to pass on any of the costs to riders; hence, the low wages that taxi drivers
complained of.
If transaction costs are the cause of excess supply, then what is the solution? Coase’s writings encourage two possible paths: first, enact solutions that
reduce transaction costs;83 second, if government action is necessary, take great
care while attempting to fix market inefficiencies, since transaction costs will
cause government failures to linger far longer and impose far higher costs.84
Given the level of technology available in the early years of the Twentieth Cen79

For an expansive explanation of transaction costs and its importance to economic analysis, see MICHAEL C. MUNGER, TOMORROW 3.0: TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE SHARING
ECONOMY 2–4, 71–72 (2018); see also Brian L. Frye, Copyright as Charity, 39 NOVA L.
REV. 343, 350 (2015) (“[T]hese direct [government] subsidies [to charities] are vulnerable to
market failures caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs.”); Merrill F. Hoopengardner,
Note, Nontraditional Venture Capital: An Economic Development Strategy for Alaska, 20
ALASKA L. REV. 357, 367 (2003) (“[S]ome economists believe that the lack of welldeveloped rural venture capital markets may be caused by ‘market failures that result from
imperfect information and high transaction costs.’ ”); George M. Padis, Note, Overcoming
the “Energy Paradox” in the Built Environment, 42 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 85, 101 (2011) (“[I]n
green building there are potential challenges caused by market failure—the high transaction
costs associated with differentiated stakeholders—and irrational actors.”).
80 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (describing firms
as a solution which facilitates long-term production by reducing the cost of bargaining).
81 After all, “all most people want is the service the durable good can provide.” MUNGER,
supra note 79, at 74. “I do not really want to own a car; I want convenient, safe, and reliable
transportation services.” Id. at 76.
82 The CB radio was invented by Al Gross in 1948. Al Gross: The Walkie-Talkie,
LEMELSON-MIT, https://lemelson.mit.edu/resources/al-gross [https://perma.cc/4T86-25S4
(last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
83 See Coase, supra note 47, at 2; Coase, supra note 78, at 15–16 (arguing that allocation of
enforceable property rights to radio spectrum would reduce transaction costs and facilitate
efficient use of radio spectrum).
84
Coase, supra note 47, at 19; Kidd, supra note 46, at 154.
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tury, the first option may have been unavailable but, in adopting fixed limits on
taxis—a more traditional, non-Coaseian solution to the problem—civic leaders
at the time may have sent their cities down the path that Coase warned about,
one with higher costs that linger, perhaps for decades.85
It did not take long before technologies arose that would reduce the transaction costs in point-to-point transportation markets. A mere eight years after
introduction of the medallion system in New York City, for example, the CB
radio was invented, allowing for more efficient connection of riders and drivers.86 If cities had waited before imposing a regulatory “solution,” there may
never have been a need. Once the regulations were in place and competition
was effectively constrained, it was unlikely that the regulations would ever be
removed. As discussed in the following Part, those in the industry—who were
enjoying the ability to charge above-market rates for taxi services—had become invested in the persistence of the existing regime, making any change unlikely, at best.
II. A SOLUTION, BUT AT WHAT COST?
The choices made by lawmakers and regulators in response to technological changes in the transportation industry may have been motivated by pure intentions, but the consequences were less than desirable. In a classic case of the
law of unintended consequences,87 policies ostensibly designed to protect drivers and consumers ended up hurting them, as well as society at large, by granting monopoly power to medallion owners. This Part will establish that a medallion system—or any systematic effort to inhibit entry into the market—has a
dark side that should be considered but traditionally is not.
To begin, assume that a city implements a medallion system, either to
counter a perceived negative externality or perhaps merely to protect favored
market incumbents in the point-to-point transportation industry. Either way, the
immediate effect of the policy is to restrict taxi services proportional to the
number of medallions issued,88 likely to a level below what would exist without
government restrictions. Each licensed taxi driver is granted some additional
85

For an explanation regarding the higher costs associated with the type of barriers to entry
that medallion systems represent, see infra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. For an explanation of how the taxi industry, once entrenched, will fight to maintain those costly barriers, see infra Section III.B.1–4.
86 See Al Gross: The Walkie-Talkie, supra note 82.
87 Economist and Nobel Laureate F.A. Hayek was not the originator of the concept of unintended consequences, but he is well known for his quote that “[t]he curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can
design.” 1 F. A. HAYEK, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, in THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF FRIEDRICH AUGUST HAYEK 76 (W. W. Bartley, III et al. eds., 1988).
88 There will be some number of illegal taxi services who will risk detection and prosecution, but that number is likely to be low if the city has a reasonable budget for enforcement.
If the city chooses not to enforce its medallion system, then the effects described herein will
not occur.
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level of market power, which the driver can use to raise the price. Because this
price will be higher than the cost of producing taxi services,89 profits per taxi
should increase. These profits will be higher than those obtainable in an unrestricted market, so they represent what economists call monopoly rents.90 The
total rents arising from the government intervention will be divided among
market participants that were not forced out of the market by the municipality’s
implementing the medallion system.
It is important at this juncture to make clear that what is being discussed
here are not traditional profits earned by innovative businesses. Profitable innovation includes reduction of production costs or creation of new products
that are in high demand because they make consumers’ lives better. Those profits serve a useful social function, in that they motivate further innovation that
makes all our lives better.91 Instead, the profits—or monopoly rents—in this
scenario are those that arise as governments take action that inhibits competition. Without competition, sellers can maintain high profits without having to
cater to the demands of consumers.92 Imposing mandatory limits on supply, as
with a medallion system, is one way to inhibit markets, protect incumbents, and
generate monopoly rents, but there are many others, such as trade barriers (tariffs, quotas, export subsidies) and a host of regulatory barriers, to competition.93
The counterpart to the windfall enjoyed by medallion owners is a loss suffered by other taxi drivers, those who would have provided taxi services but
were not granted a medallion, and consumers who are unable to find a taxi because taxi services have been restricted. Even though there are drivers willing
to provide a service and consumers willing to pay those drivers, the medallion
system prohibits a voluntary bargain between them. Economists refer to this
phenomenon as deadweight loss, the loss to society when individuals are prohibited from entering into voluntary transactions solely because government

89

This requires a simplifying assumption, that medallions are given to those who are the
lowest-cost providers of point-to-point transportation services. In reality, it is likely that politics will enter the initial decision of who will receive medallions, so costs for some sellers
may be higher than c, and profits may be lower than indicated here. Over time, however, a
higher-cost seller will have strong incentives to sell the medallion to a seller with a lower
production cost, who will be willing to pay a premium to gain the extra profits.
90 E.g., David Hurlbut, Fixing the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol for
Related Intellectual Property, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379, 382 n.8 (1994) (“Monopoly rents
are additional producer earnings that exist because of barriers to competition, and are thus
conceptually different from profits that derive from successful market competition.”).
91 Robert Cooter, An Escape from Poverty: Developing Productive Organizations, 12 SW. J.
L. & TRADE AM. 181, 183 (2006).
92 See Kidd, supra note 8, at 170.
93 E.g., Jeremy Kidd, Quacks or Bootleggers: Who’s Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, 75
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 367, 441–42 (2018) (describing how disclosure requirements could
hinder the hedge fund model and protect traditional financial institutions’ market power).
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regulations do not allow it.94 Particularly relevant to the present discussion,
deadweight loss increases proportionally to the monopoly rents obtained by the
protected industry incumbents.95
The medallion system purports to fix the problem of too many taxis on the
road. The second half of municipal regulation of the point-to-point transportation industry purports to fix the problem of too little remuneration by fixing
taxi rates at some level.96 Unlike a price floor (e.g., minimum wage laws) or a
price ceiling (e.g., rent-control statutes), taxi fare schedules establish a single
method for determining the price of a taxi ride.97 As a preliminary matter, the
fact that prices are prohibited from fluctuating means that most of the equilibrating mechanisms of the market have been eliminated.98 In addition, as
demonstrated in Figure 3, the refusal to allow price to fluctuate creates additional deadweight loss.
As a baseline, we assume that demand is defined by D1 and supply by S1.
Under those circumstances, the market will trend toward a quantity q+ and a
price of p+. The medallion system restricts the quantity of taxi services to a
maximum of q* and causes the market price to rise to p*.99 The new higher
price increases profits, which would be represented by the rectangle between p*
and c1, the cost of producing taxi services at that level of output. The policy also generates deadweight loss, represented by the triangle created by D1 and S1,
between q* and q+.

94

Salil K. Mehra, Competition Law for a Post-Scarcity World, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1, 23
(2016).
95 See id. at 24.
96 Fixed rates were designed to halt “fare wars” that were lowering drivers’ wages. U.S.
DEP’T OF TRANSP., TAXICAB REGULATION IN U.S. CITIES 6–7 (1983), https://ia801302.us.
archive.org/17/items/taxicabregulatio00shaw/taxicabregulatio00shaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6BGC-5A6W]. But see Dempsey, supra note 54, at 107 (“prices rose following taxi deregulation in every documented case.”).
97 E.g., Department of For-Hire Vehicles, supra note 64.
98 Cf. READ, supra note 34, at 9–10.
99 For purposes of illustration, this demonstration will assume that policy makers have chosen a quantity of medallions that is lower than what would be needed to satisfy market demand, leaving some riders unable to obtain rides. It is possible to set the limit above the
market equilibrium but that would be a non-binding constraint and would have no impact on
the market. A medallion system can only solve the problem of too many taxis on the street if
the upper limit is set lower than the market equilibrium.

20 NEV. L.J. 581

Spring 2020]

WHO’S AFRAID OF UBER?

601

FIGURE 3
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Now, imagine a decrease in income—perhaps due to a recession—which
causes demand to fall from D1 to D2. An unfettered market would shift towards
q‡ and p‡. With the medallion system in place, the market would end up at q*
and p+, instead. Profits would fall, now represented by the black rectangle between p+ and c1, and deadweight loss would shrink, represented by the striped
triangle between q* and q‡. If, however, price controls had also been put in
place to protect industry profits, the combination of price and quantity restrictions create additional chaos. If price was set at p*, consistent with the
market price when the medallion system was implemented, then a shift in demand to D2 will cause the actual quantity of taxi services to fall all the way to
q″. Profits under both price and quantity restrictions will be the dark gray rectangle between p* and c2, the cost of producing taxi services at that output level.
Profits are higher in this scenario than if price were allowed to fluctuate, although a significant decrease in quantity might mean that some drivers have exited the industry, so it is not an unequivocal improvement for drivers. More importantly, the deadweight loss under both price and quantity controls
(represented by the lightly shaded triangle between q″ and q‡) is dramatically
higher than under quantity controls, alone, so society pays a heavy cost for the
extra regulations.
In other words, if the goal is merely to reduce negative externalities, quantity control mechanisms would be sufficient, if imperfect.100 Adding a price
control mechanism that serves no purpose but to preserve or increase monopoly
rents reveals the likely goal of the set of regulations, and that consumer protection and societal welfare were not it. Even taxi drivers suffer in this scenario, as
q″ is significantly lower than q*, the number of medallions outstanding. In other
100

See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
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words, there are too few potential riders for all medallions to be effectively
used.
While the details differ between municipalities, the point-to-point transportation market exhibited the same basic dynamics in most major cities for almost
a century.101 High barriers to entry kept the total number of taxis down, and cities mandated a specific fare schedule.102 Taxi consumers paid higher prices for
transportation from providers who faced minimal incentives to provide high
quality service. Rising deadweight losses manifested in many consumers who
simply could not obtain taxi services and taxi drivers who couldn’t make a living. What was the purpose of all this suffering and consumer exploitation? Protection of the pool of monopoly rents.
III. OF GALBRAITHIAN BAPTISTS AND TULLOCKIAN BOOTLEGGERS
For decades, the benefits to consumers of a free market in point-to-point
transportation took a back seat to protection of entrenched interests. In many
cases, the taxi industry was largely in charge of taxi regulations, by way of taxi
commissions that exercised tremendous power.103 One extreme example is the
New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) which, according to its
website, has a nine-member board and approximately 600 employees assigned
to various divisions and bureaus throughout city government.104 Eight of the
nine board members receive no salary,105 but the ninth—the chair—does and is
101

See HARA ASSOCS., INC., supra note 59, at 17.
Id. at 5, 10.
103 In addition to the powerful New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, discussed
infra, other cities have seen their taxi commissions—ostensibly public safety entities—
acting expressly against ride-sharing in order to defend taxis. E.g., Maria Bustillos, How
L.A.’s Taxi Boss Plans to Take on Uber, NEW YORKER (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.newyo
rker.com/business/currency/city-los-angeles-plans-make-taxis-like-uber [https://perma.cc/
Q2KC-SKCC]. Most major cities have had—and most still have—taxi commissions that establish the requirements for entering the industry and, in those cities with medallion or fixedlimit systems, maintain strong barriers to competition. See, e.g., About TLC, N.Y.C. TAXI &
LIMOUSINE COMM’N, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/about-tlc.page [https://perma.cc/
3V8D-FWK8] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020); Commissions, CITY OF L.A. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://ladot.lacity.org/what-we-do/about-us/commissions [https://perma.cc/8W9M-ZWS2]
(last visited Jan. 19, 2020); Department of For-Hire Vehicles, supra note 64; Hackney Carriage Unit, BOS. POLICE DEP’T, https://bpdnews.com/hackney-carriage-unit [https://perma.cc
/2FNZ-LPSB] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020); The Transportation Division, MD. PUB. SERV.
COMM’N, https://www.psc.state.md.us/transportation/ [https://perma.cc/3N8G-YYAS] (last
visited Jan. 19, 2020). Some states have even centralized their taxi regulations, in order to
limit the power of localities to erect barriers to competition from ride-sharing. E.g., Transportation Regulation Division, CITY OF DALL., https://dallascityhall.com/departments/avi
ation/Pages/Transportation-For-Hire.aspx[https://perma.cc/4D8V-YYLQ] (last visited Jan.
19, 2020). (including a state-mandated disclosure that ride-sharing companies need not apply
to city government for a license to operate in Dallas).
104 About TLC, supra note 103.
105 Id. Although that would not preclude them from extracting various other benefits from
those being regulated in return for maintaining protections against competition.
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responsible for supervising the remaining TLC employees.106 While not an extremely large number in context of a city the size of New York City, the reach
of the TLC is more troubling, giving it the capacity to identify threats to taxis’
monopoly power and defeat them, regardless of their source.
The TLC is but one example of the special interests who stand to lose,
should the current regime be disrupted. Ride-sharing, as a concept, poses a significant threat to the regime, as it allows consumers to bypass the restrictive
barriers that protect the taxi industry, obtaining transportation from other consumers.107 It also allows individuals with driving skills and equipment (cars) to
offer their driving services to consumers without having to obtain the imprimatur of—and pay requisite fees to—city regulatory bodies and entrenched incumbents. Most interestingly, it does this by doing what Coase would have
suggested, reducing transaction costs.108
Figure 4 illustrates what has occurred as ride-sharing emerged as a substantial substitute good to the taxi industry. Ride-sharing, having captured the attention of transportation consumers, reduces demand for taxi rides from D1 to D2.
The reduction in demand is high enough that it has caused monopoly rents—the
darkly shaded rectangle—to decline significantly. A decline in the pool of monopoly rents should result in a decline in the price of buying into the system by
purchasing a medallion. That is, in fact, precisely what is apparent from medallion sales data—in New York City, medallion prices declined from a high of
$1.05 million dollars to less than $200,000 during 2013 to 2016, a period when
TNCs were increasing in popularity.109 In Chicago, medallion prices declined
from $350,000 to less than $100,000 during the same period.110 There is still
some value to owning a medallion, but that value appears to be shrinking rapidly, and may eventually fall to zero if left unimpeded by government interven106

Id.
“Rumor has it that the concept for Uber was born one winter night during the [2008
LeWeb tech] conference when [a] pair [of friends] w[ere] unable to get a cab.” Dan Blystone, The Story of Uber, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personalfinance/111015/story-uber.asp [https://perma.cc/8K6P-BK35] (last updated June 25, 2019).
108 MUNGER, supra note 79, at 75–83; Brishen Rogers, The Social Cost of Uber, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 87 (2015) (“Uber’s key innovation lies in having reduced the transaction costs that otherwise plague the sector . . . .”).
109 A September 2017 foreclosure sale of 46 medallions occurred for $8.65 million, or approximately $186,000 per medallion. Raul Hernandez, A Mysterious Hedge Fund Just
Scooped Up the Foreclosed Medallions from New York City’s ‘Taxi King’, BUS. INSIDER
(Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/nyc-taxi-king-foreclosed-medallionsscooped-up-by-hedge-fund-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/D6T7-DW83].
110 CITY OF CHI. BUS. AFFAIRS AND CONSUMER PROT., MEDALLION TRANSFER PRICES FROM
1/1/2013 TO 12/31/2013, https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/bacp/pu
blicvehicleinfo/medallionowners/taxicabtransferprices01022013.pdf [https://perma.cc/74D8TEGY] (last updated Jan. 1, 2014); CITY OF CHI. BUS. AFFAIRS AND CONSUMER PROT., 2016
MEDALLION TRANSFER PRICES, https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts
/bacp/publicvehicleinfo/medallionowners/2016ListMedallionTransferPrices132017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9GB-MGZC] (last updated Jan. 13, 2017).
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tion.111 The other notable result of a significant fall in demand with price restrictions in place is the size of the deadweight loss. Fortunately, in a market
with close substitutes, at least half of the deadweight loss equation—
consumers—still have transportation. Those who have invested in the ability to
transport others by taxi are left without the ability to make a profit off their services, but the culprit is not TNCs. Instead, the culprit is the pricing restrictions
imposed by the city. Without those, existing taxi drivers would be able to sell
q‡ rides, instead of q″.
FIGURE 4
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This change is unambiguously good for consumers, but the entrenched interests suffer losses and should be expected to push back against this kind of
disruptive innovation. And so they have, with restrictions on TNCs being
passed by many municipal bodies.112 In some cities, those restrictions were
111

See, e.g., infra Figure 5.
E.g., Sandra Baker, Fort Worth Updating Vehicle-For-Hire Rules, FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM (Feb. 8, 2016, 5:17 PM), https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/article59
204168.html [https://perma.cc/7NVL-H5MG]; Aman Batheja, With New Rules, Will Uber,
Lyft Stay in Austin?, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 17, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2015/12/17/austin-city-council-approves-new-uber-regs-uber-th/ [https://perma.cc/UDG4SKJD]; Austin Berg, Chicago Passes New Rules on Uber and Lyft, ILL. POL’Y (June 22,
2016), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/chicago-passes-new-rules-on-uber-and-lyft/ [https://
perma.cc/7TLE-CFYW]; William Crum, Oklahoma City Traffic Commission Approves Regulating App-Based Ride Services, OKLAHOMAN (July 22, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://oklaho
man.com/article/5011736/oklahoma-city-traffic-commission-approves-regulating-app
-based-ride-services [https://perma.cc/WK87-KYM4]; Drew Joseph, Uber Says Policy
Changes Still Not Enough to Stay in SA, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, https://www.mysan
antonio.com/news/local/article/Taxi-industry-protests-ahead-of-council-vote-on-6114
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eventually rescinded, city officers bowing to the pressure of the consuming
public.113 In other cities, however, the restrictions remain strong, inhibiting the
expansion of TNCs and a corresponding reduction in demand, which might
eventually eliminate the feasibility of taxis as a form of transportation. Notice,
however, that taxis become infeasible, not unwanted. In a free market, taxis
would likely remain a viable alternative; only the mandated fare schedule keeps
individual taxi drivers from making a profit. Consumers, too, would be illserved if taxis ceased to operate, as that would eliminate a substitute for TNCs
and allow TNCs to exercise market power, albeit based on network effects rather than government restrictions.114
Given the threat to the taxi regime posed by TNCs, it should not be surprising that current industry incumbents have pushed back against the advent of
ride-sharing. The criticisms have been withering, at times, such as the President
of a Philadelphia taxi company’s115 comparing TNCs to a terrorist organization,
or European taxi drivers’ comparing TNCs to rampaging Vikings.116 Criticisms
have also come from outside the industry, often from academia.117 These out552.php [https://perma.cc/Y2YZ-HNBQ] (last updated Mar. 4, 2015, 6:22 PM); Jared Meyer, Seattle Doesn’t Care About Part-time Ridesharing Drivers, FORBES.COM (Dec. 6, 2016,
7:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2016/12/06/seattle-doesnt-care-about
-part-time-ridesharing-drivers/#6472337e47b0 [https://perma.cc/9QPK-9SBX]; JC Reindl,
Higher Taxi Rates but Fewer Shenanigans, DETROIT FREE PRESS, https://www.freep.com/
story/money/business/michigan/2014/10/27/taxi-regs-rewrite-detroit-uber-lyft/17963613/
[https://perma.cc/V2BD-R2GC] (last updated Oct. 27, 2014, 10:40 AM). But see Alex Samuels, Uber, Lyft Return to Austin as Texas Gov. Abbott Signs Ride-Hailing Measure into
Law, TEX. TRIB., https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/29/texas-gov-greg-abbott-signs
-measure-creating-statewide-regulations-rid/ [https://perma.cc/6ESV-QNTD] (last updated
May 29, 2017, 11:00 AM) (describing a Texas law that created statewide regulations for
TNCs and superseded more onerous local regulations).
113 Fort Lauderdale is such a city. While ride-sharing services are currently available at the
Fort Lauderdale Airport, that was not always the case, with Broward County maintaining
restrictions on Uber and other ride-sharing companies until pressured to rescind the restrictions. See Brittany Wallman, Uber Stops Pickups at Lauderdale Airport, Port, SOUTH
FLA. SUN SENTINEL (June 23, 2015, 9:39 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/brow
ard/fl-uber-broward-court-20150623-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q4R2-3TKB].
114 “Network effects occur, quite simply, when the value of a product increases through a
rise in the number of people using it.” Catherine Tucker & Alexander Marthews, Social
Networks, Advertising, and Antitrust, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1211, 1217 (2012). Network
effects can inhibit competition by making it difficult for new market entrants to convince
consumers to use a product with a smaller network. E.g., id. at 1218–19.
115 Alexis Kleinman, President of Taxi Association Compares UberX to ISIS, HUFFINGTON
POST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/uberx-isis_n_6070472 [https://perma.cc/L7XH-ZJY6]
(last updated Oct. 30, 2014) (While speaking at a public hearing, Alex Friedman, President
of the Pennsylvania Taxi Association said, “I try to equate this illegal operation of UberX as
a terroristic act like ISIS invading the Middle East . . . .”).
116 Guy Hedgecoe, Can This Man Kill Uber?, POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/tito
-alvarez-uber-battle-ecj-decision/ [https://perma.cc/N5GP-MF8X] (last updated July 3, 2017,
1:17 PM) (Tito Álvarez, spokesman for Élite Taxi, a European taxi cooperative argued
“[t]hey [Uber] are illegal, they pillage countries—they have to go . . . .”).
117
See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
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side criticisms often have a more subtle and scholarly tone but serve the same
end, protection of incumbent interests. The combination provides an excellent
example of what Bruce Yandle referred to as “bootleggers and Baptists.”118
A. Bootleggers and Baptists Basics
Notwithstanding the strong criticisms of some in the industry and others in
politics and academia, ride-sharing continues to be popular with the riding public.119 The continued opposition to TNCs in many large cities—running, as it
does, counter to the obvious will of consumers—would seem illogical without
the insights of Yandle’s Bootlegger and Baptist theory. Yandle showed how the
combined efforts of anti-liquor Baptists and pro-moonshine bootleggers in the
southern United States combined to push and maintain restrictions on the sale
of alcohol on Sunday long after prohibition-era preferences for abstinence had
passed.120 Applying the theory more broadly, the allegorical Baptists are the
morally persuasive advocates and the bootleggers secretly and financially support the crusade with profits, rather than morality, in mind.121
For a Baptist, regulation is justified by a desire to correct perceived market
failures,122 but the bootlegger sees it as an opportunity to pursue private gain

118

Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 REGULATION 5, 5 (1999).
Tony Arevalo, 40 Fascinating Uber Statistics and Facts in 2020, CARSURANCE (Jan. 7,
2020), https://carsurance.net/blog/uber-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/79EB-PEAA] (reporting
that “Uber facilitates as many as 40 million rides per month in the U.S. alone.”).
120 Yandle, supra note 118, at 5.
121 Interestingly, while the theory has far broader application, occasionally the Baptists are
actually Baptists and the bootleggers are actually the purveyors of alcoholic beverages. In
Arkansas, for example, counties must go through a complicated process to permit alcohol
sales. Those efforts are almost always opposed by a combination of local Baptist churches
and the owners of alcohol stores that sit just across the county lines in a wet county. Jeremy
Horpedahl, Bootleggers, Baptists, and Ballots: Spending on Alcohol Legalization Elections
in Arkansas (working paper) (on file with author).
122 See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, Shareholder Proposals, and Engagement Between Managers and Owners, 94 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 300, 311–18 (2017) (arguing that the market for corporate control has ceased to function, removing essential market
mechanisms for policing director behavior); Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 185–86 (2002) (describing the public interest theory of regulation). The term “market failure” has a reasonably
precise definition: some circumstance that interferes with market mechanisms and precludes
prices from adjusting to achieve efficient outcomes. See e.g., COASE, supra note 38, at 133
(“The kind of situation which economists are prone to consider as requiring corrective governmental action is, in fact, often the result of governmental action. Such action is not necessarily unwise. But there is a real danger that extensive governmental intervention in the economic system may lead to the protection of those responsible for harmful effects being
carried too far.”); see also HENRY N. BUTLER ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS
125–26 (3d ed. 2014). The term is used colloquially in far less precise fashion, often referring to any market outcome that does not match the speaker’s normative view of what the
world should look like. As it turns out, those suboptimal outcomes can be the result of prior
government action, making further government intervention unwise. See Kidd, supra note
119
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outside of a market context by having the government erect barriers to entry.123
As barriers go up, competition falters and monopoly profits rise.124 Those barriers protect industry incumbents, which is why those incumbents lobby heavily
for regulations to be imposed on competitors and themselves.125 This type of
anti-consumer action is touted as necessary to protect consumers,126 but that
moralizing just conceals—often barely so—the naked self-interest of those who
position themselves to garner rents.
Once this principle is understood, many regulations make more sense.
Seemingly futile regulations—including those that harm consumer welfare—
persist because the goals they are designed to achieve are those of the bootlegger, rather than the Baptist. In other words, the common references to the law
of unintended consequences might be naïve, offered because the individual
simply has not thought clearly about who the policy choice was really intended
to benefit.
The coalition of bootleggers and Baptists is a strong one. Separately, money and morality are powerful tools; combined, they gain strength beyond what
can be explained by mere summation of their efforts. Baptists bring an organizational strength and an ability to use that strength publicly, filling airwaves or
protest spaces with moral arguments—verbal or written on placards—in favor
of government action. Bootleggers bring financial and other pressures to bear,
including a willingness to spend in anticipation of some expected future income
to be derived from government action.127
Each can achieve some desired results alone, but if their interests align,
each one reduces the marginal costs of the other. Convincing government
agents to change policy is a costly endeavor, especially when the Baptist wish-

46, at 149; Kidd & Padgett, supra note 47, at 11 (arguing that the U.S. trucker shortage is the
result of unhelpful Department of Transportation safety regulations).
123 See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist,
7 REGULATION 12, 13 (1983).
124 See discussion supra Part II; see also Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists, Bootleggers &
Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 348 (2016).
125 An early example is the London weavers’ demanding and receiving specific regulatory
mention in the Magna Carta. Yandle, supra note 123, at 12.
126 An example can be drawn directly from the history of the legal profession. During the
1930s, the organized bar lobbied heavily for imposition of sanctions for the unauthorized
practice of law. See Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal Bootleggers”—The Role of the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts’ Inherent Powers in
the Early Twentieth Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 103–18 (2009). Publicly, the lobbying
efforts centered around the alleged need to protect consumers from unqualified practitioners,
but the driving motivation was a dramatic reduction in the legal profession’s income due to
“overcrowding of the profession and to competition from nonlawyers.” Id. at 67–68, 114–15.
127 The bootleggers are engaged in what public choice scholars term “rent-seeking,” seeking
to gain extra-market returns through the use of government barriers to competition. Kidd,
supra note 8, at 168–69. Those engaged in rent-seeking will invest resources up to the
amount they expect to gain, once the barriers are in place. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare
Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 7 W. ECON. J. 224, 229–30 (1967).
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es to shift government policy away from public preferences.128 Material support
from the bootlegger increases the productivity of the Baptist’s efforts.129 Similarly, when rents are being sought in an area of government that is likely to attract public interest or controversy, such as when regulation will run counter to
public preferences, rent-seeking expenditures will be more productive if they
can hide behind a morally acceptable front.130 Neither can fully achieve its
goals without the specialized skills of the other; combined, the range of possibilities increases.131
Although an alignment of interests is essential for both groups to enjoy the
full benefits of their collusion, their interests align procedurally far more often
than would be expected of other political coalitions.132 This is because bootleggers care little for the overall social purpose of the regulation and Baptists care
about that aspect almost exclusively.133 Bootleggers will focus on the details of
the regulation because that is where profits are made, and Baptists will remain
largely unconcerned about the details.134 The bootlegger will choose, from the
many options for achieving the Baptist’s broad goals, the route that offers the
highest profits and trust that the Baptist’s zeal for the regulation will assure reasonable enforcement.135 As a result, there are far fewer opportunities for bootleggers and Baptists to find themselves at cross-purposes.136
It should be obvious that there are limits to what bootleggers and Baptists
can achieve with their resources and moralizing. First, regulation is subject to
increasing marginal costs and decreasing marginal benefits, and the electorate
will eventually reject even the most convincing Baptist if the costs rise high
enough or the benefits fall low enough. Also, money and morals are ineffective
if the regulation cannot take a form acceptable to the regulator,137 as regulators
have their own incentives. Some of those incentives will be outcome specific, if
128

E.g., Horpedahl, supra note 121 (describing the efforts of actual Baptist churches to defeat public referenda to reinstate alcohol sales in dry Arkansas counties, funded largely by
alcohol retailers in neighboring counties).
129 Because Baptists do not gain monetarily from their preferred change in policy, they can
only invest resources currently on hand. Bootleggers, on the other hand, can invest not only
current funds but can borrow against expected funds to be obtained once the policy is
changed. Most Baptists, therefore, will be money-poor and their efforts are less likely to succeed. An infusion of resources from the bootlegger can vault a money-poor Baptist into contention.
130 See Yandle & Buck, supra note 122, at 188.
131 Kidd, supra note 93, at 402–03; Yandle, supra note 123, at 14.
132 See Yandle, supra note 118, at 6.
133 See id. at 5–6.
134 See id. at 5 (“It is worth noting that it is the details of a regulation that usually win the
endorsement of bootleggers . . . .”).
135 Id.
136 See id.
137 The term “regulator” here is used in its broadest sense, to include any who regulate business. It therefore includes not only those who work for the administrative state, but also
those in the legislative and judicial branches.
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the regulator has been “captured.”138 More generally, however, regulators must
maximize their budgets or minimize costs, subject to certain baseline goals.139
Of course, the costs to be minimized are the regulator’s costs, not costs to consumers or producers, so regulators probably want rules that are easy to enforce
and unlikely to generate mistakes or political costs.
Simple rules that can be generally applied most often meet these criteria.
Regulators want fewer points where discretion must be exercised, as each point
can lead to a disgruntled politician or powerful voter, imperiling future budgets.140 Simple rules requiring uniform behavior also make compliance easier
and violations less likely, so detection and enforcement costs will be lower. The
influence of the Baptist allows the regulator to credibly claim that there are solutions at hand,141 and the bootlegger’s attention to detail can help craft a simple rule that achieves its ends. The bootlegger also has the finances needed to
“grease the political machinery”142 and buy off more tepid opposition.
B. Bootleggers and Transitional Gains
Who are the bootleggers in the ridesharing scenario? At one level, the
question is simple—who is financially invested in the protectionist regime that
preserves the pool of monopoly rents? Identifying bootleggers is always an imprecise endeavor, as bootleggers are usually content to remain behind the
scenes143—the success of their endeavors may depend on it. Some bootleggers
have an obvious link to the industry being protected by government regulation
while others require greater scrutiny to identify.144 In order to proceed methodi-

138

See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 90–91 (1982). Early capture theories of regulation
were proposed by MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 156 (1955), and GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 103 (1963). Regulatory capture is not
just a danger from the regulated industry, because other groups can have strong interests in
regulatory outcomes. See Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack
Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1847 (2007).
139 See Yandle, supra note 123, at 13.
140 See id.
141 When the solutions fail, the complexity of the system gives the regulators cover for
claiming good faith in attempting to solve the problem.
142 Yandle, supra note 118, at 5.
143 Yandle & Buck, supra note 122, at 188 (“[Baptists] take the moral high ground, while
the bootleggers persuade politicians quietly, behind closed doors.”). Given the potential for
political and economic backlash, it would seem foolhardy for an individual or company to
boast about convincing regulators to enact policies that inhibit competition and allow the
bootlegger to gain monopoly profits.
144 For example, when scrubbers were mandated on all coal-fired power plants, it is easy to
identify the bootleggers—the owners of high-sulfur coal deposits—whose coal gained a
purely regulatory advantage over the owners of low-sulfur coal. Yandle, supra note 118, at
6. Conversely, when the northern spotted owl was protected by closing off millions of acres
of public forest, it would not have been obvious that the bootlegger was Weyerhaeuser, who

20 NEV. L.J. 581

610

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

cally, the search for bootleggers should begin by identifying: (1) destructive
policies that persist in a way that suggest the presence of a bootlegger,145 and
(2) groups that benefit from the policy’s results.
In the case of ride-sharing, there are any number of policies that create barriers to entry into the market. Some are obvious, such as the medallion system
(or other quantity restrictions) and price-control regimes. Other smaller barriers
inhibit entry by raising fixed costs. These barriers include dress codes, drug
testing, language proficiency rules, and fire extinguisher requirements146 or
even more costly barriers such as high insurance premiums for part-time drivers, costly background checks, and so on.147 In every case, these barriers are
defended on consumer-protection grounds, although many bear only tangentially on actual consumer safety, and all of them are substitutes for market regulation, which can protect consumers without inhibiting competition.148
As for those who benefit from these barriers and the pool of monopoly
rents that they generate, the list begins with taxi drivers, but it does not end
there. A helpful exercise is to imagine who would find their lives significantly
disrupted if ride-sharing eliminated the pool of monopoly rents overnight, possibly even eliminating the taxi industry, in its entirety. More than just taxi drivers, who would lose employment in the taxi industry, would be hurt. Taxi companies, who have accumulated large amounts of physical capital, would find
that capital somewhat devalued and their business model disrupted in a TNCdominated world. Taxi commissions, like the aforementioned New York City
TLC, wield significant political power that would likely disappear—along with
owned the adjacent private timber that became significantly more valuable because it was
not subject to the regulations. See id.
145 Government rarely achieves its goals in a cost-effective manner. A government program
might fail for a host of reasons or might achieve some stated goals but in an inefficient manner, so failure is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. What is most important is that
the policy imposes costs on society to the benefit of a special interest.
146 As an interesting contrast, the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission has
promulgated extensive rules for TNCs, N.Y.C., N.Y., § 78-01 (2020), while Chicago requires only a chauffer’s license and a car less than six years old. Brett Helling, The Complete
Guide to Driving for Uber and Lyft in Chicago, RIDESTER (Feb. 1, 2020),
https://www.ridester.com/drive-uber-lyft-chicago/. Houston originally had its own TNC lic
ense and set of regulations, but the Texas government has now standardized ride-sharing
rules across Texas. TEX., OCC. CODE § 2402.001 (2017).
147 E.g., Sandra Baker, Uber, Lyft Win Deregulation Efforts in Fort Worth, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM (June 28, 2016, 9:19 PM), https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/fortworth/article86557452.html [https://perma.cc/QXV9-TC85] (describing elimination of the
requirement of expensive fingerprint background checks); Berg, supra note 112 (describing
previous Chicago rules requiring drug testing and physical exams for drivers); Ryan Poe, 5
Things to Know About Memphis’ Proposed Ride-Sharing Rules, COM. APPEAL (Feb. 26,
2015), http://archive.commercialappeal.com/news/government/city/5-things-to-know-aboutmemphis-proposed-ride-sharing-rules-ep-956165667-324455001.html [https://perma.cc/
2RPG-J8Z3] (describing a requirement to collect and turn over to the city significant data
about rides and riders).
148
See Kidd, supra note 8, at 187–91.
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the benefits it generates—if taxis were no longer a dominant mode of municipal
transportation. Finally, the financial institutions who have financed a significant portion of the debt required to afford the high cost of a medallion or other
fixed costs of entry into the industry would find the value of that debt reduced
to zero. Other interests might indirectly benefit from the pool of monopoly
rents, such as companies that manufacture industry-specific equipment like taxi
meters. Without barriers to entry into those markets, however, they would be
unable to charge above-market rates for their products, so they are likely not
sharing in the pool of monopoly rents.
Each group of potential bootleggers has something to lose if TNCs crowd
out taxis in the point-to-point transportation market. In order to determine the
strength of the incentives to engage in bootlegging activity, those potential
losses should be measured against the gains that they would achieve in a TNCheavy market.
1. Taxi Drivers
The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency estimates that the average number of rides per taxi declined 65 percent between 2012 and 2014,
while ride-sharing was increasing its penetration into the market.149 In an extreme case, taxi drivers could lose their livelihood if ride-sharing dominates the
transportation market. Even in a less extreme case, however, if a medallion system is effectively defeated by ride-sharing, wages for taxi drivers will decrease.150
On the other hand, it would not be unexpected for the advent of ridesharing to increase the total demand for point-to-point transportation; simply
affording consumers more choice increases consumer welfare, but other factors
could also increase demand. Increased competition should lead to drivers being
more courteous, especially in those cases where the transportation company uses consumer feedback to determine continued employment.151 Other consumer-

149

Megan Garber, After Uber, San Francisco Has Seen a 65% Decline in Cab Use,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/whatuber-is-doing-to-cabs-in-san-francisco-in-1-crazy-chart/380378/ [https://perma.cc/B7BP
-V6ZW]. But see TIM O’REILLY, WHAT’S THE FUTURE AND WHY IT’S UP TO US 57 (2017)
(“In the long run, Uber and Lyft are not competing with taxicab companies, but with car
ownership. After all, if you can summon a car and driver at low cost via the touch of a button
on your phone, why should you bother owning one at all, especially if you live in the city?”).
150 See Joshua D. Angrist et al., Uber vs. Taxi: A Driver’s Eye View 2 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23891, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23891
[https://perma.cc/L8KP-NNC2].
151 Consumer feedback, of course, allows all potential future customers to know the nature
of the services provided by the driver, including the level of courtesy, presumably an amenity for most consumers. Drivers will therefore have an incentive to provide courtesy to current riders in an attempt to attract more future riders. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 20 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776) [hereinafter WEALTH OF NATIONS] (“It is not
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friendly shifts might also arise from the need to attract customers, all raising the
overall quality of the service and, ceteris paribus, increasing demand.
Moreover, the taxi industry is kept from competing with ride-sharing by
onerous regulations;152 remove those regulations and open the taxi industry to
free competition, and the industry could innovate in unforeseen ways that
would allow taxi drivers to remain competitive.153 Notwithstanding all of these
possibilities for improvement in the market, if the taxi industry were forced to
contract in response to competition, some or all of the displaced drivers would
find a home in the ride-sharing sector.154 The most fundamental skills required
of taxi drivers and drivers using TNC software are the same,155 so the human
capital built up by taxi drivers over their years of driving would transition
well.156 Some of them, perhaps a great many, who currently earn very low rents
from the current regime if they do not own their own taxi or medallion,157
might actually see an increase in their income.158 In sum, taxi drivers appear to
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest.”).
152 See, e.g., James Briggs, 7 Rules Indy Taxis Follow, but Not Uber, INDYSTAR (Apr. 28,
2017, 2:44 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/local/marion-county/2017/04/28/7rules-indianapolis-taxis-dont-apply-uber-lyft/100948002/ [https://perma.cc/3SKT-763L].
153 Indeed, some cities have begun freeing up taxi companies to innovate. Fort Worth, Texas, for one, has begun setting basic standards and allowing each taxi company to determine
the best way to meet that standard. Other cities have been pressured to go in the opposite direction. See Rachel Riley, Colorado Springs Taxi Drivers Seeking Level Playing Field with
Ridesharing Services, GAZETTE (Mar. 19, 2017), https://gazette.com/business/coloradosprings-taxi-drivers-seeking-level-playing-field-with-ridesharing/article_ce496f1a-7a3c5019-b7b6-b9dcf05e2268.html [https://perma.cc/7JTT-YHYE] (describing taxi industry efforts to impose the same burdensome regulations that taxis must abide on TNCs).
154 This transition has likely already begun. See Thor Berger et al., Drivers of Disruption?
Estimating the Uber Effect, 110 EUR. ECON. R. 197, 198 (2018).
155 First and foremost, the ability to drive a car in a safe, efficient, and speedy manner is key
for any successful for-hire transportation provider. Likewise, some measure of customer service is required for both taxi drivers and ride-share drivers if they wish to be successful.
Some knowledge of the streets upon which the driver is travelling is helpful, but not essential, given the availability of GPS technology to guide the driver in unknown areas.
156 There is also certain to be some industry-specific human capital that will be wasted in a
transition to a TNC format—the ability to operate a taxi meter, for example—but most of the
skills necessary to drive a taxi will be the same as those required to drive their own car while
using TNC software.
157 There are occasional stories relating the plight of taxi drivers who, having saved all their
pennies to buy a medallion, then see the value of the medallion degraded by the success of
TNCs. E.g., Reihan Salam, Taxi-Driver Suicides Are a Warning, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/taxi-driver-suicides-are-a-warning/561
926/ [https://perma.cc/B9QH-3XTC]. As a general rule, however, medallions are not typically owned by taxi drivers but by wealthy investors, taxi companies, or others with greater access to financial capital. See Pranay Gupte, New York’s Biggest Owner of Taxi Medallions,
N.Y. SUN (Aug. 8, 2005).
158 Berger et al. discovered that the introduction of ride-sharing reduces the wages of taxi
drivers but that self-employed drivers, including ride-sharing drivers, see their incomes rise.
Berger et al., supra note 154, at 198. Angrist et al. also find that when the cost of leasing a
medallion is high, Boston taxi drivers who choose to drive for Uber see an increase in their
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be enjoying only a minimal share of the monopoly rents, so they have only
weak incentives to become bootleggers in the fight to inhibit innovation and
competition.
2. Taxi Companies
The second set of potential bootleggers is taxi companies that own multiple
taxis and medallions, the value of which have declined precipitously and will
continue to do so if TNCs are allowed to compete with taxis in the absence of
protectionist regulations. Even in cities where the number of medallions is not
fixed, restrictions on ride-sharing would still inhibit competition and increase
the monopoly rents available to incumbent firms. Taxi companies almost certainly arise as a way of minimizing transaction costs and capturing economies
of scale. Ride-sharing is an alternative—and arguably more efficient—way of
minimizing transaction costs, so taxi companies’ profits would likely decline if
ride-sharing were allowed to expand. Unlike taxi drivers, who are likely too
dispersed to effectively lobby against ride-sharing, there are a relatively small
number of taxi companies in each large city,159 allowing taxi companies to coordinate their efforts to head off a disruptive potential competitor.
As with taxi drivers, however, there may be a valuable place for taxi companies in a TNC-heavy market. The economies of scale that taxi companies
currently enjoy could still be exploited in a ride-sharing world. One possible
analogy is the electricity market. A stable base load is needed on a constant basis to handle the majority of society’s needs, typically provided by burning
cheap fossil fuels or using nuclear energy.160 Other energy sources can be used
to provide “peak power,” handling the spikes in demand that occur throughout
the day and night.161 In transportation, taxi companies might provide transporwages. Angrist et al., supra note 150, at 29. At a more basic, intuitive level, it should be apparent that individuals who have spent significant portions of their lives transporting individuals from point to point within a given city will have a greater understanding of city
roads, traffic patterns, and even the traffic signals. That knowledge should provide former
taxi drivers with an advantage over the average driver, allowing them to handle more fares
per hour and, as a result, collecting higher incomes.
159 For example, as of May 2019, there were 16 taxi companies licensed by the Nevada
Taxicab Authority that provide services to Las Vegas, Nevada. NEVADA TAXICAB
AUTHORITY, TAXICAB INDUSTRY STATISTICS (2019), http://taxi.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/taxi
nvgov/content/About_Us/ALL/Statistics/May_%202019_COMBINED.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7L2T-DSCD] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020). Of those, three are consolidated into Yellow-Checker-Star Transportation, and four others appear to be new licensees, leaving an effective number of licensed companies at ten. See YELLOW CHECKER STAR TRANSP.,
https://www.ycstrans.com/ [https://perma.cc/G628-WRHA] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020). In Los
Angeles, California, there are only 9 companies operating under franchise licenses in the
city. CITY OF L.A. TAXI SERV., http://www.taxicabsla.org/ [https://perma.cc/DNK5-N4Q6]
(last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
160 Fred Bosselman, The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
5 (2007).
161
Id. at 7.
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tation base load, giving each city sufficient transportation-for-hire options most
of the time. Ride-sharing fills in the gaps, providing transportation options
above and beyond what traditional taxis cannot. This is clearly so during times
of extreme demand, where ride-sharing services implement “surge pricing” to
draw more drivers and cars into the market to take advantage of increased
rates.162 It is possible that ride-sharing could provide all of a city’s transportation for hire needs, but there is no large city where that scenario has been tried.
In the end, a world in which ride-sharing dominates might simply see taxi
companies shift their fleets to ride-sharing. It is possible that this shift has already begun, with many taxi companies using their own Uber-like apps to gain
the convenience of ride-sharing within the taxi industry.163 If the industry were
freed from onerous regulations and allowed to innovate, that transition might
occur much more rapidly. This is not to say that taxi companies are not part of
a bootlegger coalition against ride-sharing, only that their incentives are not
strongly opposed to ride-sharing per se, but to the unfair competition an unregulated ride-sharing market poses to a highly regulated taxi industry. Of course,
in cities with a fixed number of taxis, companies who own medallions would
want to defend the future rents represented by those medallions and would fight
far longer against ride-sharing.
3. Taxi Commissions
The third set of potential bootleggers is the industry associations that facilitate protectionist measures and extract some of the monopoly rents. As discussed above, the New York City TLC has employees throughout New York
City government.164 Viewed through the lens of public choice, that fact is troubling, as it gives the TLC influence throughout the government in addition to
control over a vital part of the transportation infrastructure of the largest city in
the United States. That level of power and the rent-seeking expenditures that
will be directed at the TLC are not something that will be surrendered without a
struggle.
The most obvious way that a taxi commission can use its power is to maintain restrictions on the supply of taxis, which generates the pool of monopoly
162

See Claire A. Hill, Repugnant Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research
and Policy Agenda, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 994 (2017) (“Uber’s business model includes getting more drivers on the road by offering the drivers more money.”). New York
City adopted a “surge pricing” model for its taxicabs in 2015, adding a flat $4.50 surcharge
for all flat-rate trips between Manhattan and JFK Airport for the hours of 4:00 pm to 8:00
pm. Taxis: Yellow Taxi Fare, , NYC311, https://portal.311.nyc.gov/article/?kanumber=KA01245 [https://perma.cc/7RAQ-CN6C] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
163 One of the most popular and successful taxi-hailing apps is Easy Taxi, founded in Brasil
and based on the Cabify platform, which operates in 30 countries, providing many of the
same features as ride-sharing apps, such as the ability to track taxis in real time. Passengers,
EASY: UM APP DA CABIFY, http://www.easytaxi.com/br/passageiros/ [https://perma.cc/FSQ49JPD] (last visited Jan. 9, 2020).
164
Supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
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rents.165 Those who benefit from the restrictions and resulting profits will endeavor to curry favor with the taxi commission, directing lobbying efforts at the
commission. Perhaps this view is too cynical; the commission might be restricting supply for other reasons. It is plausible that the crowded streets of large cities would be even worse if taxis were unregulated, so perhaps the price of taxi
service includes a premium for being able to transverse the city more rapidly.166
Commissions also set rates, almost certainly higher than the price that
would prevail in a competitive market but lower than the price that would be
set by a monopolist.167 As TNCs gain market power, demand for taxi services
would likely decline and the pool of monopoly rents would begin to dissipate.
Medallion prices would then begin to fall, and the taxi commission’s power
could be threatened. A taxi commission does not profit directly from the sale of
medallions, but medallion prices are an indication of the available monopoly
rents;168 a reduction in rents means lower incentives to curry favor with the
commission that, in turn, would create pressure to reduce personnel and budget
at the commission.169 In order to protect its rent-seeking income, the taxi commission and its employees could be expected to mobilize and exert political
pressures in opposition to ride-sharing.
It is possible that many individuals who merely want to assure a safe and
affordable point-to-point transportation market would find commission employment appealing. Even these individuals would face incentives to engage in
bootlegging behavior, but their personal preferences might enable them to resist
the temptation. However, the near certainty of rent-seeking makes it a near certainty that those with pure motives would be driven out, as those willing to ex-

165

Supra note 54 and accompanying text.
New York City has debated implementation of a program that would make this theoretical idea into a reality, charging a tax for driving in certain areas of Manhattan. Those willing
to incur the tax would have a less congested driving experience. See Winnie Hu, Congestion
Pricing Falters in New York, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/03/31/nyregion/congestion-pricing-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/DVG3MN7L].
167 E.g., Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 515, 520–21 (1985) (describing the ability of the antitrust regulator to limit a monopolist’s ability to freely set prices).
168 See Jeremy Horpedahl, Ideology Uber Alles? Economics Bloggers on Uber, Lyft, and
Other Transportation Network Companies, 12 ECON J. WATCH 360, 362 (2015) (“The fact
that individual taxicab drivers and corporate taxicab companies are willing to pay such large
sums for the permits is a strong indication that monopoly rents are being earned.”).
169 See Omar Al Ubaydli, Economics 101: Right from the Start, Governments Really Have
Not Liked Uber, NATIONAL (June 10, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/business/economics101-right-from-the-start-governments-really-have-not-liked-uber-1.62851
[https://perma.cc/A2BM-ZKDJ] (“[B]ureaucrats fear that they will always be one step behind Uber and its offspring, which may in turn cause senior policymakers to simply give
up.”).
166
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tract rents would be far more likely to invest the time and resources to obtain a
position where rent-extraction was available.170
Taxi commissions have strong incentives to engage in bootlegging behavior, and yet taxi commissions—or the personnel, at least—will likely have little
difficulty adapting to a world where TNCs have come to dominate. Government bureaucracies are notoriously resilient; even if there were not a single taxi
to regulate, a commission would find some way to expand its mandate to encompass other areas of transportation and/or consumer protection.
4. Financial Institutions
The fourth and perhaps least obvious group that stands to lose with the advent of ride-sharing is comprised of financial institutions that finance the fixed
costs of the taxi industry, primarily taxis and medallions. Given the high price
that medallions once commanded—and still do, to a certain extent—at auction,
it should come as no surprise that medallions are highly leveraged.171 Financial
firms are willing to finance medallions because they represent a future stream
of income that is “guaranteed” by the measures put in place to protect the monopoly rents by restricting supply of taxis.172 Those barriers to entry raise the
price of a medallion, which increases monthly loan payments by medallion
purchasers and, correspondingly, reduces their returns.173 In effect, this is a
transfer from the owner of the medallion to the owner of the debt, who will receive the higher principle and interest payments.
As ride-sharing enters the picture, the risk associated with holding taxirelated debt will rise as the point-to-point transportation market becomes more
competitive. Increased competition will drive down demand for taxi services,
reducing the monopoly rents available to medallion owners. Those owners will
find it more difficult to generate sufficient revenues to cover their monthly
170

Basic principles of public choice economics argue that individuals seeking benefits from
government agents will be willing to expend significant amounts, up to the value of the benefits, during the seeking process. See Tullock, supra note 127, at 228. The same will be true
for those government officials who see an opportunity to extract rents, as they will be willing
to expend more effort and resources to achieve the position where extraction is a feasible
option. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 105–09 (1987).
171 See Brian M. Rosenthal, Facing Ruin, Taxi Drivers to Get $10 Million Break and Loan
Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/nyregion/
nyc-taxi-medallions.html [https://perma.cc/C6FA-ZVDW] (describing the loans that medal
ion owners entered in order to buy their medallions).
172 AJ Eschle, Tax Medallion Loans Lose Value, Burdening Financial Institutions, CLA
(Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.claconnect.com/resources/articles/2017/taxi-medallion-loanslose-value-burdening-financial-institutions.
173 That this is true should be obvious, as loan payments are a cost that must be subtracted
from gross revenues in calculating return on investment. Andrew Beattie, A Guide to Calculating Return on Investment, INVESTOPEDIA (July 1, 2019), https://www.investopedia.
com/articles/basics/10/guide-to-calculating-roi.asp.
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payments, eventually leading to default.174 Consequently, financiers will experience a greater risk of non-payment. This risk is not uncommon to financial
institutions, as economic shifts—notably recessions—can increase the risk of
nonpayment on car loans, home loans, and a host of commercial loans.175 Taximedallion financiers face an additional risk arising from ride-sharing—the risk
that the financed asset’s value will decline to zero.
With most financial assets, the value of the asset and the ability of the borrower to repay the loan are, at best, indirectly connected. A homeowner may
lose her job and fail to make monthly mortgage payments, for example, but the
bank still has the right to take possession of the home, which has a value independent of the borrower’s monthly earnings. A financier who has financed the
purchase of a taxi medallion will have rights to repossess the medallion, but its
value will have declined in proportion to the reduction in the borrower’s
monthly earnings, and the lender will realize a loss.176 If the loan is a recourse
loan, there may be some ability to recover the shortfall from the medallion’s
owner, but bankruptcy laws will limit that avenue of recourse.177 To the extent
that the medallion is owned by a corporation or LLC, recovery will be limited
to the total assets held by the entity.178 From a historical perspective,179 that
174

E.g., Aamer Madhani, Once a Sure Bet, Taxi Medallions Becoming Unsellable, USA
TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/05/17/taxi-medallion-values-declineuber-rideshare/27314735/ [https://perma.cc/4NK9-PNNU] (last updated May 18, 2015, 8:22
AM) (“In New York, taxi mogul Eygeny Friedman is locked in a court battle with Citibank,
to whom he owes some $31 million after some medallion loans matured.”); Polly Mosendz
& Shahien Nasiripour, Taxi Medallion Prices Are Plummeting, Endangering Loans,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2017, 9:14 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0130/taxi-medallion-prices-are-plummeting-endangering-loans [https://perma.cc/9W6S-FK57]
(“According to a recent presentation prepared for Capital One Financial Corp. investors,
some 81 percent of its $690 million in loans for taxi medallions are at risk of default.”).
175 E.g., Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 9 (2011) (“The slowdown in the real economy then feeds back into the financial system, as distressed consumers and businesses default
on loans, worsening bank balance sheets.”).
176 As a rough estimate, the 13,587 taxi medallions in New York City were worth, in 2013,
as much as $17.6 billion. See, e.g., Ameena Walker, In NYC, 139 Prized Yellow Taxi Medallions Will Hit the Auction Block, CURBED N.Y. (June 11, 2018, 4:16 PM),
https://ny.curbed.com/2018/6/11/17450366/nyc-taxi-medallions-bankruptcy-auction [htt
ps://perma.cc/KFA2-QTNF] (“The 139 medallions are part of a collection of the 13,587 licensed medallions that are required to operate a yellow taxi in New York City. In 2013, a
medallion was worth as much as $1.3 million . . . .”). At more recent prices, those same medallions are worth just over $2.2 billion, a reduction in value of $15.4 billion. Id.
(“[C]ompetition from ride-hailing apps like Uber and Lyft has driven medallion prices down
to as low as $160,000.”). There is no good estimate for how much of that $15.4 billion loss
lenders suffered, but there is reason to suspect that it is a significant portion. That amount is
not likely enough to seriously damage any financial institution—particularly given that the
losses were likely spread across numerous institutions—but neither is it an insignificant
amount.
177 Ron Harris & Asher Meir, Non-Recourse Mortgages—A Fresh Start, 21 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 119, 126 (2013).
178
See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9 (N.Y. 1966).
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should offer, at best, only limited reassurance to someone trying to recoup a
loss.
The close relationship between medallion value and monthly stream of income makes the risk born by the financier fundamentally different. Importantly,
when much of the financing was arranged, a taxi medallion would have seemed
like a relatively riskless investment. An individual borrower might not have
been a sound money manager, or may have fallen on hard times, but repayment
default would have resulted in the financier taking possession of a still-valuable
asset, which could be immediately resold to another willing buyer, recouping
losses. So long as the barriers to entry were maintained—an almost certain
proposition even two decades ago—the financier incurred relatively little risk.
As the specter of ride-sharing approached, the risk of non-payment became
compounded with the risk of total asset loss180 in a way not easy to anticipate
when the loan originated. Faced with this new and changed risk, financiers
have a strong incentive to engage in bootlegging, opposing ride-sharing in order to maintain the monopoly rents that could stabilize their risk.
Figure 5 shows the data from New York City medallion transfers from
January 2017 through September 2019.181 Two obvious trends present themselves. First, the average price of medallions had been falling during that time
period, continuing the decline that had begun after the peak in 2013. Second,
there was an increasing trend of foreclosure sales of medallions, which appears
to drive most of the increase in total sales volume during 2018–19. If these medallions were purchased anywhere near the peak, then the financial institutions
who were forced to foreclose on the medallions would have taken a loss on
each sale. Many more medallions in this situation—representing bad debt for
those same financial institutions—might still remain under immediate threat of
foreclosure. If the trend is not reversed, it could mean continued losses—
perhaps in the billions of dollars—to various financial institutions; that magnitude of potential losses would incentivize anyone to take action.

179

The classic case of Walkovszky v. Carlton shows how corporations that own taxi medallions have traditionally been intentionally under-capitalized, in order to defeat lawsuits. See
id.
180 The dramatic reduction in the value of the medallions, discussed in Part II, supra and
represented graphically in Figure 5, infra, would have increased both risks. The risk of nonpayment would rise because lower medallion prices indicate lower profits from operation of
a taxi within the medallion system. The risk of total asset loss would need to be considered,
as well, given that there must be at least some non-zero probability that the trend downward
will continue if ride-sharing continues to increase in popularity.
181 Medallion Transfer Reports, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMO. COMM’N, https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/tlc/businesses/medallion-transfers.page [https://perma.cc/3NS4-YW5M] (last visited
Jan. 7, 2020) (raw data source).
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FIGURE 5

If financial institutions have joined the bootlegging coalition, it could explain why ride-sharing continues to face significant obstacles. The taxi industry
has amassed significant political power in some large cities over the last century, and entrenched political interests are very difficult to dislodge,182 but is the
combination of taxi drivers, companies, and commissions sufficient to explain
why ride-sharing has had success in some cities but failed in others? To be certain, cultural factors will also play a role, and there may be regional and local
dynamics that can never be accounted for, but it is possible that financial interests are strong enough in some cities to add hidden strength to the public antiride-sharing coalition.
5. A Word on Transitional Gains
Before identifying the Baptists to our taxi bootleggers, it is important to
specify the nature of the pool of monopoly rents and its effect on the wealth of
those who share it on an ongoing basis. Once the pool is created, so is a concentrated group who will do much to sustain it.183 That is standard public
182

A. Michael Froomkin, The Empire Strikes Back, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1101, 1108
(1998) (“Established interests that profit from a given legal regime will ordinarily be the
ones with the most cash to spend on lobbying and other activities designed to lock in their
advantages or to head off upstart competitors using upstart technologies.”); accord Stephen
R. Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, Part I: Control of Cable Systems by
Local Broadcasters, 22 STAN. L. REV. 221, 326 (1970) (“By now the Commission should
have learned that ownership interests once entrenched are difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge.”); Louis Michael Seidman, J. Skelly Wright and the Limits of Legal Liberalism, 61
LOY. L. REV. 69, 89 (2015) (“Legal rhetoric alone cannot dislodge powerful and deeply entrenched interests.”).
183 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 5–8 (1971); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND

20 NEV. L.J. 581

620

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

choice theory, but the entrenched interests might not be realizing as much
wealth as it might initially appear. The reason is something that economist
Gordon Tullock referred to as the transitional gains trap.184 Briefly, those who
are granted the initial medallions receive tremendous profits, and are significantly better off, but those who purchase the medallion in the future are likely
to spend a significant portion of the monopoly rents to obtain the medallion, so
that the stream of monopoly rents are, in effect, merely compensating the owner for the purchase price, rather than enriching the owner with new profits.185
An inspection at any point in time would reveal medallion owners who are unwilling to surrender the monopoly grant, but not solely because they fear losing
an easy source of profits. Instead, they will refuse because doing so would
mean they would not recoup the amount they spent purchasing the medallion.186
Moreover, Tullock postulated that medallion owners were not even efficiently exploiting consumers.187 Consumers were harmed by the medallion system, to be sure, but medallion holders were not able to effectively utilize their
market power because of the inability to effectively adjust the number of medallions.188 As the population of a city rises, so does the demand for taxi services, but the medallion system does not adjust rapidly with rising population.189 The result is that monopoly rents cannot be effectively maximized. No
medallion owner will willingly accept a dilution of the medallion’s market value by giving out new medallions, and increasing medallion value by a fractional value is nonsensical—what would it mean to be permitted to operate 1.37
taxis?190 The number of medallions will therefore tend to increase only in
clumsy fashion, in big increments, if at all.191
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 51–56 (1988);
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 367–70 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
184 Gordon Tullock, The Transitional Gains Trap, 6 BELL J. ECON. 671, 671 (1975). The taxi
medallion system was, in fact, the primary example of the transitional gains trap used by
Tullock. Id. at 672.
185 Id. at 672. Tullock points out that the owners of the medallions would still earn “normal
profits,” id., an economic term that means the amount that would make them indifferent between owning a medallion and investing in the next best alternative. Kevin S. Marshall, Free
Enterprise and the Rule of Law: The Political Economy of Executive Discretion (Efficiency
Implications of Regulatory Enforcement Strategies), 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 235, 276–
77 (2010).
186 Others have argued that it is never socially beneficial to deregulate, as the loss to the
monopolist would exceed the social gain arising from the deregulation. See, e.g., Robert D.
Tollison & Robert E. Wagner, Romance, Realism, and Economic Reform, 44 KYKLOS 57, 62
(1991). If the amount spent on the preferential barriers are sunk, the economy may be left
permanently worse off, and deregulation may only impose greater costs. Robert E. McCormick et al., The Disinterest in Deregulation: Reply, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 564, 564 (1986).
187 Tullock, supra note 184, at 673.
188 See id. at 672.
189 Id. at 673.
190 See id.
191
See id.
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In light of this discussion and the fact that, for many decades, medallions
continued to sell for extremely high prices,192 it bears asking whether the
strongest form of the transitional gains trap theory is applicable. In other words,
can it be true that all of the gains from owning a medallion are expended in
purchasing the medallion? The likely answer is no, as that would make every
purchaser indifferent to buying a medallion or spending the funds on some other endeavor. The high price of medallions can be accounted for by the existence
of the transitional gains trap, as a seller will insist on extracting the value of the
protected position conferred by the medallion.193 The volume of medallion
sales, however, indicates that buyers are not indifferent to paying the purchase
price for those medallions. Some of the affirmative interest in medallions might
be a difference in expectations for the future, with buyers anticipating an arbitrage opportunity. It is also possible, however, that there is some residual benefit to owning a medallion; not worth the full value of the medallion, but greater
than just breaking even. Given the existence of a transitional gains trap, existing market participants will oppose a change in regime, in part to avoid transitional losses194 and in part to preserve any additional monopoly rents.195
Relevant to our taxonomy of taxi bootleggers, if Tullock’s theory is true,
the only set of bootleggers who enjoy the full benefits of the pool of monopoly
rents are the financiers. The reason why is simple. For the taxi drivers, taxi
companies, and taxi commissions, the high cost of entry predicted by Tullock
draws down the net value of the pool of rents. For financiers, however, the
higher costs must be financed; even if financiers are unable to charge above
market interest rates for these loans, the higher principle value means that financiers were able, for decades, to realize reliable returns on much larger sums.
Understanding transitional gains also helps explain why financiers—who have
far greater flexibility to invest in either a taxi-dominated world or a TNCdominated one—would be sufficiently motivated to oppose ride-sharing innovations. Not only do financiers stand to lose the entirety of their investment, but
they have also been enjoying benefits derived from a greater portion of the pool
of monopoly rents.

192

See N.Y. CITY TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NEW YORK
CITY COUNCIL 7–8, www1.nyc.gov/assets/tlc/downloads/pdf/annual_report03.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2ULV-AY6J].
193 As discussed infra Section III.B.5, even complete dissipation of the monopoly rents into
the purchase price still benefits one group, the financiers who provide funds to purchase medallions. A higher price means a higher loan balance and higher principle and interest payments. Therefore, to the extent that the strong form of Tullock’s theory is applicable, it
strengthens the argument that financial institutions who provide loans to the taxi industry are
the most likely to oppose diminishing barriers to entry.
194 Tullock, supra note 184, at 673.
195 Tullock proposes one way to escape from the transitional gains trap. In essence, we find
those riders who would like to use a taxi, but will not at the mandated price, tax them and
save the money to buy back and destroy all medallions. Id. at 672. That solution has no practical chance of being implemented, however. Id.
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C. Academic Baptists?
Consumers and potential consumers of point-to-point transportation have
suffered for years under government price and quantity controls over taxis.196
The advent of a technology that breaks through the barriers and introduces
competition into a stagnant market should be greeted with cheers. There has
been some of that, to be sure, but much of the response, particularly from the
halls of academia, has been less laudatory.197 It is within the academy that we
find the majority of taxi-Baptists, those who oppose ride-sharing and other innovations based on perceived risks to consumers, market stability, the rule of
law, and so on. These taxi-Baptists have their allies outside of the academy, in
legislatures and regulatory agencies, but academics have proven to be the loudest and most vociferous opponents of these innovations and the disruption they
bring.198
Opposition to new technologies is not a recent phenomenon, with fear of
how they change our world motivating many critiques in the past.199 Innovators
who take risks in pursuit of that change are often rewarded by consumers who
purchase their products but are also castigated by others and accused of destruction, rather than creation. Of course, as Joseph Schumpeter pointed out
more than seventy years ago, all progress comes at the expense of existing
technologies. This “[c]reative [d]estruction”200 leaves behind those goods and

196

Supra Part II.
One example—that doesn’t bother to hide its disdain for these technological advances—
is Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1628, who refer to the sharing economy as the “taking”
economy. They are hardly the only ones. See Kathrine T. Bartlett, Response, Sharing Sexism, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1163, 1164–65 (2016); Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the
Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1026–27 (2016); Inara Scott & Elizabeth
Brown, Redefining and Regulating the New Sharing Economy, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 553,
556–57 (2017); Abbey Stemler, Feedback Loop Failure: Implications for the SelfRegulation of the Sharing Economy, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 673, 675–76 (2017); Abbey
Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for Regulating Innovation,
67 EMORY L.J. 197, 200–01 (2017); Kellen Zale, When Everything is Small: The Regulatory
Challenge of Scale in the Sharing Economy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 956–57 (2016);
Brett Harris, Note, Uber, Lyft, and Regulating the Sharing Economy, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
269, 270 (2017).
198 Two important caveats must be made at this point, however. First, the claim is not that
academia is opposed to the sharing economy—it is not—but that much of the opposition to
the sharing economy (and certainly some of the most forceful) comes from academia, rather
than from consumers or producers, broadly. Second, not all academics who distrust sharing
economy technologies are severe enough in their opposition that they are worthy of the moniker, Galbraithian Baptist. Infra Section III.C.2.c.ii.
199 E.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 41 (1985) (“The enemies,
in both cases, are advanced technology, the specialization and organization of men and process that this requires and the resulting commitment of time and capital.”). For an extended
treatment of the objections raised by those who are concerned about the changes the future
brings, see VIRGINIA POSTREL, THE FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES xv–xvi (1998).
200
JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1943).
197
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services that no longer satisfy the desires of consumers;201 specific producers
may lose, but others gain, and every consumer benefits from improvements in
price and quality. A careful analysis will always consider the relative benefits
and costs of an innovation before passing judgment. Before cataloging the criticisms of the taxi-Baptists, this subpart will offer a summary of the benefits that
ride-sharing and the sharing economy offer, broadly.
1. Benefits of Ride-Sharing
The benefits of ride-sharing technology—and most of the sharing economy, for that matter—are often misunderstood. One analysis, for example, described the primary benefit as “help[ing] people collaborate economically at
scale.”202 This perspective fundamentally misses the primary benefit; it is not
the grand scale of TNCs platforms that makes the technology so useful but rather the minute scale of facilitating two complete strangers’ coordinating for
mutual benefit.203 One random person with an available car and one random
person in need of a ride would never, in a world without TNCs, be able to enter
into a mutually-beneficial transaction. TNCs make that possible, and it is that
amazing feat—individual and personal in nature, not economic collaboration
“at scale”—that makes TNCs so beneficial. It is also essential to keep in mind
that the benefits of ride-sharing are individual and personal in nature, in that
they help individuals lead better lives. That the sharing economy has aggregate
benefits should not become a distraction from the reality that it is individuals
whose lives are improved.
In addition to improving lives through lowering prices and improving the
availability of transportation options,204 TNCs provide many improvements in
quality. These benefits come in part from the nature of ride-sharing and, in part,
as a condition of a competitive market. For example, ride-share vehicles are
more likely to be clean and safe because drivers are more likely to take care of
cars that they personally own.205 This is particularly the case if a driver uses
ride-sharing as a way of affording a new vehicle for her personal use. By the
same token, TNCs face reputational pressures that lead them to require newer
cars, and individual drivers will receive higher ratings—allowing them to keep
201

It is true that this disruption is “annoying” to those whose jobs are impacted, Calo &
Rosenblat, supra, note 4, at 1628, but that innovation also brings tremendous benefits.
202 Id. at 1635.
203 It is also flawed to consider that the real “promise of the sharing economy” is based “on
ideas of social reciprocity.” Id. at 1636. The individual who makes that little extra bit of income—thereby avoiding eviction—and the individual who gets a ride to an important interview—gaining the job that gives her the first step to achieving her life’s dreams—are the
promise of ride-sharing.
204 Supra Section III.C.1.
205 E.g., Kathleen Elkins, A Day in the Life of an Uber, Lyft and Juno Driver Who Makes
About $6,000 a Month in NYC, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/30/a-day-in-the-lifeof-a-full-time-uber-lyft-and-juno-driver-in-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/BT9C-KF5V] (last
updated Jan. 31, 2019, 12:19 PM).
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driving—and even receive tips if they have a nicer, safer car.206 TNC drivers
are also likely to drive more safely than taxicab drivers, both to achieve higher
ratings and for the simple fact that the car is their personal car; getting in an accident would not only affect their work lives but all aspects of their lives. The
rating systems provide meaningful feedback opportunities to customers, so that
TNC customers enjoy a level of control over the services provided to them that
does not exist in many areas of transportation outside of the sharing economy.207
The TNC business model provides other benefits to riders. Centralized
payment is the easiest and most reliable way of ensuring that TNCs are paid for
their facilitation services. As a result, riders can purchase a ride without carrying a card or cash. This is not only an added convenience but also increases
safety. There are many convenience benefits, as would be expected when a customer can be instantly connected to any driver in the vicinity, rather than relying on finding a vacant taxi or arranging with a specific taxi company. Convenience also extends to drivers, who can enjoy the benefits of working whenever
is suitable for their lifestyles and schedules.208 They can choose to use ride206

Uber drivers must maintain a minimum driver rating—on a five-star scale—to avoid having their account “deactivat[ed].” Henry Ross, Comment, Ridesharing’s House of Cards:
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc. and the Viability of Uber’s Labor Model in Washington, 90
WASH. L. REV. 1431, 1440–41 (2015); see also Alison Griswold, Uber is Finally Making
Riders Explain Themselves When They Rate a Driver Below Five Stars, QUARTZ (July 25,
2017), https://qz.com/1038285/uber-will-make-riders-explain-when-they-rate-a-driver-be
low-five-stars/ [https://perma.cc/DSM9-QMZG]. The required minimum varies by city. Uber Community Guidelines, UBER https://www.uber.com/legal/community-guidelines/us-en/
[https://perma.cc/XR9T-GFBT] (last visited Jan. 23, 2020). Uber followed Lyft’s example in
allowing riders to tip drivers in 2017. Marco della Cava, Uber Adds Tipping Feature, Matching Lyft, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/06/20/
uber-adds-tipping-feature-matching-lyft/103039304/ [https://perma.cc/3PWE-97UG] (last
updated June 21, 2017, 6:58 AM). Because the safety and comfort of the car is an important
part of the quality of the ride-share service, those who have better cars should expect to receive greater tips.
207 While the ability to provide ex-post feedback may not initially appear to grant the rider
control, it will after further reflection on the importance of reputational factors in the ridesharing industry. A driver knows that the rider can give a low rating if the ride is not satisfactory, and a low rating will have a negative impact on the driver’s ability to continue accepting rides through the service. As a result, the driver is more disposed to accede to reasonable requests by the rider than many providers of goods or services would be. See Alex
Rosenblat et al., Discriminating Tastes: Customer Ratings as Vehicles for Bias,
INTELLIGENCE & AUTONOMY 5–6 (2016), https://datasociety.net/pubs/ia/Discriminating_
Tastes_Customer_Ratings_as_Vehicles_for_Bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8A4-JYY8]. But
see infra Section III.C.2.b.
208 Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
22843, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22843.pdf [https://perma.cc/G35G-L65U]. This
flexibility has significant positive spillovers into other areas of drivers’ lives—increased
flexibility in earnings opportunities means that employers particularly of part-time workers,
must treat employees better or they will leave to operate in the sharing economy. Strangely,
some critics of ride-sharing argue that this benefit of flexibility is part of a “utopian vision of
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sharing as a part-time supplement to an existing job, or they can drive full time,
each according to individual circumstances and desires.209 In doing so, drivers
put to use what would otherwise be dead capital—a car that sits idle most of the
week—into an income opportunity.210 The increased income that drivers obtain
can make a tremendous difference, as it could allow them to purchase a more
reliable vehicle, move to a safer neighborhood, afford better educational opportunities for their children, and so on.211 Driving for a TNC might also smooth
the transition between jobs, keeping incomes higher—thereby mitigating a decline in aggregate spending in the economy—and limiting the need for government assistance.212
These benefits are particularly relevant to individuals who live in poorer
neighborhoods, as well as those who live around them.213 Many of their neighbors, for example, will have few transportation options, but a TNC driver who
begins each day in the neighborhood can supplement regular income while
providing neighbors with more convenient transportation.214 Some researchers

workers who work by ‘uncoerced choice,’ ” an ideal that is fractured by the fact that some
drivers are dependent upon the work. Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1638. The benefits
of driving in a ride-share capacity are independent of other difficulties that the individuals
face in their lives. They are, however, real benefits that, without the existence of ride-sharing
technology, would not accrue to the drivers, leaving them even worse off. That those benefits may not solve all other problems is hardly reason to disparage them.
209 It may be that the greatest benefits of ride-sharing flow to members of marginalized
groups, who may have greater difficulty making a living in more traditional employment.
See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1642.
210 See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 108 (2016) (“A key
principle of the platform is putting idle capacity to work. The platform enables a more efficient use of private resources.”); see also Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable
Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J.
273, 297 (2004) (describing the benefits of exploiting “excess capacity”); Christopher
Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for
Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. PEPP. U. SCH. L. 529, 531 (2015).
211 See, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1643 (“Supplementary income from parttime work in the sharing economy may enable people to pay their rent, cover daily living
expenses, or pursue their passions or goals.”); see also Cramer & Krueger, supra note 6, at
177.
212 Hall & Krueger, supra note 208, at 12.
213 Tawanna R. Dillahunt & Amelia R. Malone, The Promise of the Sharing Economy
Among Disadvantaged Communities, 2015 CHI CROSSINGS, 2285, 2293 (S. Kor.),
https://doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702189 [https://perma.cc/57BB-8A9W]; see also Gordon
Burtch et al., Can You Gig It?: An Empirical Examination of the Gig-Economy and Entrepreneurial Activity, 64 MGMT SCI., 1, 23–24 (2018), available at https://doi.org/10.1287/
mnsc.2017.2916 [https://perma.cc/CQW7-AU28].
214 Or, the TNC driver who now owns a better, more reliable car, might provide transportation for neighbors in need for free, out of a desire to help. When one is further away from
subsistence, one can indulge the more humane urges to help others. See e.g., ADAM SMITH,
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 132 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2002) [hereinafter THEORY
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS] (“Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely.”).
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have concluded that the consumer surplus associated with just the UberX service was $6.76 billion in 2015.215
The benefits keep going. As mentioned earlier, society benefits to the extent that TNCs lower transaction costs and reduce the total number of vehicles
on the streets.216 Success by TNCs might be enough to eliminate the need for
public transportation,217 saving taxpayers a significant amount of money. By
making point-to-point transportation easier and more convenient, TNCs can also reduce drunk driving, fatal crashes, and crime.218 The first two reductions
run counter to intuition that taxi drivers, who are required to possess a commercial driver’s license, will be better and more conscientious drivers.219 Crime
could be reduced through reducing the time spent waiting for transportation—
time when one is more likely to be a target of criminals.220
The most important benefits to society from the advance of ride-sharing,
however, are likely to come in the long run, as they change the way we think
about car ownership.221 Recall that most cars sit idle for most of the time,222
which leads to a different kind of car—one built to withstand the passage of
time—rather than one built for more constant use. Cars could therefore become
more durable. As cars are used more often, but generate income while they are
used, the type of cars we see on the roads might be better in a variety of ways.
215

Peter Cohen et al., Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber 5,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22627, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22627 [https://perma.cc/U5ZB-XCJ4]. The term “consumer
surplus” is how economists describe the difference between what a consumer was willing to
pay for a good or service and the amount the consumer actually paid. Christina Majaski,
Consumer Surplus vs. Economic Surplus: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/041715/what-difference-between-consumer-surplusand-economic-surplus.asp [https://perma.cc/7SJT-5W9D] (last updated Apr. 14,
2019). Another way to think of it is that consumer surplus is the value of the other things that
the consumer was able to buy because the good was cheaper than the maximum the consumer was willing to pay. See id.
216 Rogers, supra note 108, at 90.
217 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1644–45 (“Some cities . . . are even experimenting with subsidizing ride-hail services like Uber and Lyft to meet the cities’ transportation
needs.”).
218 Angela K. Dills & Sean Mulholland, Ride-Sharing, Fatal Crashes, and Crime, 84 S.
ECON. J. 965, 988–89 (2018); Brad N. Greenwood & Sunil Wattal, Show Me the Way to Go
Home: An Empirical Investigation of Ride-Sharing and Alcohol Related Motor Vehicle Fatalities, 41 MIS Q. 163, 183 (2017).
219 Dills & Mulholland, supra note 218, at 968.
220 Id. at 969.
221 E.g., SHARED-USE MOBILITY CTR., SHARED MOBILITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
PUBLIC TRANSIT 5–9 (Mar. 2016), https://www.apta.com/wp-content/uploads/Resources/
resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/APTA-Shared-Mobility.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5TZM-XGCP].
222 Shannon Bouton et al., Urban Mobility at a Tipping Point, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept.
2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/urban-mo
bility-at-a-tipping-point# [https://perma.cc/QP4Y-6YQJ] (“Most cars sit idle 90 percent of
the time or more.”).
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As transaction costs are reduced to zero, what is now an extravagance223—a
personal driver—would become commonplace and fewer cars would be on the
road, but the characteristics of those cars would change for the better.
2. What About the Costs?
Ride-sharing is at the vanguard of the sharing economy, but all aspects of
the sharing economy have common characteristics. Specifically, it disrupts the
marketplace in ways that provide new and better services for consumers and
draw new individuals into the market as producers.224 The latter effect increases
competition and expands the stock of productive capital.225 Yet, for all these
benefits, it has earned another nickname—the taking economy226—from those
who believe that sharing technology has a darker side. As described by its detractors, the taxi-Baptists, the dangers of the “taking economy,” generally, and
TNCs, specifically, come in three forms: threats to riders, threats to drivers, and
threats to society. The first category consists of ways that the TNC business
model allegedly puts riders at risk of discrimination, as well as real risk of injury.227 The second category consists of ways that TNCs allegedly exploit the
drivers who use their services.228 The third category consists of ways that TNCs
exploit regulatory gaps and utilize their “deeply asymmetric information” to
manipulate riders and drivers in ways that destabilize markets.229
It is the third category of criticisms that merits particular concern. The first
two categories are certainly of interest to any who might suffer harm as a rider
or as a driver in a ride-sharing transaction. However, those transactions are voluntary, which should give rise to a strong presumption that the transaction was
value enhancing for the parties that agreed to it.230 That presumption could be
overcome by a showing of market inefficiencies—externalities, information
asymmetries, excess market power, etc.231—but those inefficiencies are, by definition, far more likely in the third category.

223

One internet job site reports that the national average wage for personal drivers is $19
per hour, at an average annual salary of $40,249. How Much Do Personal Driver Jobs Pay
Per Hour?, ZIPRECRUITER, https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/How-Much-Does-a-Pe
rsonal-Driver-Make-an-Hour [https://perma.cc/38VE-M8S9] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
224 Supra notes 202–04, 209 and accompanying text.
225 Supra Section III.B.4.
226 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1627.
227 Infra Section III.C.2.a.
228 Infra Section III.C.2.b.
229 Infra Section III.C.2.c.
230 See Paula M. Taffe, Note, Imputing the Wealth Maximization Principle to State Legislators, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 311, 313–14 (1987).
231
Supra Section I.D.
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a. TNCs and Riders
When riders enter a for-hire transportation vehicle, they are, to greater or
lesser extent, subject to the control of the driver. At the extreme end of the
spectrum, a driver could be abusive, physically or verbally assaulting the rider.
A driver might also be guilty of false imprisonment, refusing to let the rider exit the vehicle until the rider agrees to pay more, for example. These possibilities
exist because there is a power disparity when one individual is riding in a vehicle under the control of another, particularly when the driver is a stranger. Importantly, however, the risks do not just exist when the vehicle is being used in
ride-sharing but also exist when the vehicle is a traditional cab.
TNCs have come under criticism with allegations that their technology facilitates racial discrimination.232 To the extent anyone is subject to racial discrimination, it is troubling and worthy of condemnation, and that includes a
long history of discrimination claims against taxi companies around the country.233 When it comes to potential discrimination on the part of TNCs, it is important to point out that certain features of existing TNC-driver agreements
limit the likelihood of discrimination. First, drivers who accept too few potential rides—or cancel too many—will be terminated, so drivers have an incentive to accept all fares.234 Second, drivers are given a quality rating by every
rider, which would disincentivize abusive behavior by drivers.235 Third, there
would be a documented record of discrimination with a ride-sharing app that
would not exist with taxis, and that documentation might deter some drivers
from discriminating who might otherwise never worry about getting caught.236
Fourth, TNC riders are typically identified only by name, so a driver would
have to guess regarding the ethnicity or race of a rider.237 More importantly and
232

Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1647.
See Cornell Belcher & Dee Brown, Hailing While Black—Navigating the Discriminatory
Landscape of Transportation: Key Findings from a Survey of Chicagoans, BRILLIANT
CORNERS RES. & STRATEGIES 1, 3 (2015), http://www.brilliant-corners.com/post/hailingwhile-black [https://perma.cc/C9YY-ZQGT]; Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network Companies 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 22776, 2016) (collecting sources), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22776.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/KAK8-HU8H].
234 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1661.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 But see Ge et al., supra note 233, at 1–2 (describing experimental results where a rider
with a “distinctively black name” waited 16 to 28 percent longer for an UberX ride request
to be accepted). In the experiment, however, drivers did not see any information about the
rider until after the ride was accepted, making it difficult to identify discriminatory intent on
the part of drivers. Id. at 6. It is possible that other sharing economy providers may have
more of a problem with this than TNCs. In the case of Airbnb, for example, the capital being
shared is a home and people may be more insistent on knowing details about an individual
who will be sleeping in the home than one riding in a car. As a result, it would appear more
likely that home-sharing might facilitate discrimination better than ride-sharing. E.g., Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field
233

20 NEV. L.J. 581

Spring 2020]

WHO’S AFRAID OF UBER?

629

more generally, market forces discourage any form of discrimination, incentivizing a pursuit of money, irrespective of the characteristics of the individual
spending the money.238 A driver who chooses racial bias—or gender bias, or
sexual orientation bias, or any other form of abhorrent bias—will be poorer as a
result of fewer rides provided.239 That result will be the same, irrespective of
whether the driver is employed by a cab company or uses a TNC app to generate rides.
It has been alleged that other forms of discrimination are also possible under a TNC business model. Given the novel structure of the enterprise, some
critics have argued that individuals with disabilities will receive fewer accommodations in ride-sharing than they would under a traditional taxi model.240
One study also found that female riders are driven farther, likely being charged
more than males.241 Any form of discrimination is abhorrent, and traditional
forms of transportation can be even worse,242 yet reputation factors—driver ratings, for example—and market forces provide at least some incentive for racist
drivers to keep their biases to themselves.
Potentially more troubling are the criticisms regarding actual rider safety,
that drivers working through TNCs are subject to less stringent background
checks and, as a result, are more likely to commit crimes against riders.243 Taxi
companies are, under most municipal regulations, required to conduct fingerprint background checks on all drivers,244 something TNCs rarely do.245 This
Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 1–2 (2017). At any rate, that argues for further anonymization of user profiles—something that will become increasingly more plausible as reputational scores become more robust—not against the sharing economy, generally.
See id. at 3.
238 See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 20–21 (2d ed. 1971); Ben
Southwood, Markets Don’t Like Racism, ADAM SMITH INST. (Oct. 3, 2014),
https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/liberty-justice/markets-dont-like-racism [https://perma
.cc/B44R-C2HS]; How Free Markets Break Down Discrimination, FOUND. ECON. EDUC.
(Apr. 1, 2008), https://fee.org/articles/how-free-markets-break-down-discrimination/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/8WRB-ZKFP].
239 See BECKER, supra note 238, at 20. One possible counter to this is that a racist driver
might choose never to drive where minority riders are likely to request transportation, similar
to the claims against cab companies being unwilling to send their cars into certain minority
neighborhoods. It is entirely possible for a single driver to do so. However, to the extent that
many drivers choose that path, it merely increases the opportunities for non-racist drivers to
fill the resulting shortfall in minority-majority neighborhoods. More rides will be available,
so a non-racist driver’s time will be more effectively used and higher profits will result.
240 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1627 (citing THOMAS P. MURPHY, LEGAL RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES § 8.3.5 (2d ed. 2015)).
241 Ge et al., supra note 233, at 18.
242 See id. at 3 (“[W]e do not claim that TNC networks are ‘worse’ than the status quo.”).
243 See, e.g., Jason Hancock, Police Pan Bill to Exempt Uber and Taxis from Local Regulations at Missouri Senate Hearing, KAN. CITY STAR (Mar. 16, 2016, 10:11 AM), http://
www.kansascity.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/the-buzz/article66388242.html
[https://perma.cc/KKN3-S9N8].
244 Other possible safety precautions at the municipal level include mandatory vehicle inspection, provision of information to public officials regarding passenger names and pick-up
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issue has received substantial media attention, particularly in cities like Austin,
where passage of a mandate for fingerprint background checks left Uber and
Lyft unable to operate in the city.246
Traditional taxi background checks are far more expensive—in monetary
and time costs247—so it might be tempting to assume that TNCs avoid them
solely for profit. The comparison between taxi background checks and TNC
background checks, however, is not that simple. Fingerprint background checks
are more expensive and more burdensome, as potential drivers must find a location to have their fingerprints taken.248 There are other disadvantages, as
well, such as the fact that they may not be as comprehensive, due to the fact
that local law enforcement is not required to submit records to the FBI.249 Some
of those disadvantages are harmful to drivers, rather than to the TNCs, directly.250 For example, the background checks conducted by Uber are covered by
state consumer protection laws, so that aspiring drivers are not rejected for a
and drop off of customers, and provision of official driver records showing lack of violent
offenses, drunk or reckless driving, and a maximum number of moving violations. See, e.g.,
Poe, supra note 147.
245 See, e.g., Mike McPhate, Uber and Lyft End Rides in Austin to Protest Fingerprint
Background
Checks,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
9,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/technology/uber-and-lyft-stop-rides-in-austin-toprotest-fingerprint-background-checks.html (describing how Uber and Lyft left the Austin
market rather than conduct fingerprint background checks).
246 Id.
247 Fingerprint background checks take up to sixteen weeks and involve employment of FBI
resources, with commensurate costs. Adrienne LaFrance & Rose Eveleth, Are Taxis Safer
Than Uber?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/201
5/03/are-taxis-safer-than-uber/386207/ [https://perma.cc/6C9G-AMHW].
248 An FBI background check—which will require fingerprints—costs, on average, around
$50 plus fees. E.g., FAQs, FIELDPRINT, https://www.fieldprintusa.com/FBISubPage_Full
Width.aspx?ChannelID=272 [https://perma.cc/D6A2-BAD2] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020)
(“The total cost for this service is $50.00. This cost includes Livescan fingerprint collection,
the FBI fee and access to the Report Management Portal for 30 days.”) (last visited Jan. 10,
2020); Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L BACKGROUND CHECK, INC., https://www.nati
onalbackgroundcheck.com/faq-background-checks.htm [https://perma.cc/4QA9-JMP2]
(“How much does an FBI background check cost? Answer. $50/per person per request +
shipping fees.”) (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). Potentially more difficult for lower-income
workers is the time commitment, including finding or printing the fingerprint form and obtaining fingerprints at a fingerprint collection location, which may not be anywhere nearby.
By comparison, a non-fingerprint background check can cost as little as $8 for a federal
criminal records check, $9 for a state criminal records check, and $5 for a county criminal
records check. How Much Does It Usually Cost to Run a Background Check?, TRUSTED
EMPS. (June 20, 2018), https://www.trustedemployees.com/learning-center/articles-news
/how-much-does-it-usually-cost-to-run-a-background-check/ [https://perma.cc/37YN
ML4U].
249 LaFrance & Eveleth, supra note 247.
250 Anything that keeps drivers from applying is indirectly harmful to a TNC, since the
business model relies on a critical mass of drivers. Murat Uenlue, Business Model Canvas
Uber, INNOVATION TACTICS (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.innovationtactics.com/businessmodel-canvas-uber/ [https://perma.cc/TA4B-SQVZ].
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baseless arrest251 or because of a name that matches theirs.252 A fingerprint
background check is therefore more likely to disadvantage drivers who come
from communities that have poor relations with the police.
On a more foundational level, TNCs have strong market incentives to provide a safe environment for both drivers and riders. TNCs are, in effect, providing access to the transportation market to both; they make money only when
drivers are willing to drive, and riders are willing to ride. If riders felt unsafe
when utilizing ride-share services, that would spell the beginning of the end for
TNCs. There are occasional crimes committed by TNC drivers against riders,253
but they appear to be the exception, rather than the rule. Moreover, given the
market incentives for safety and the relative lack of serious crimes being committed,254 we should withhold judgment and let market forces determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny for aspiring TNC drivers.
251

See LaFrance & Eveleth, supra note 247. (“[T]he Fair Credit Reporting Act limits the
amount of information [Uber’s background-check company] is able to uncover[;] . . . adverse
matters that did not result in a conviction are only reportable for seven years.”).
252 State consumer protection laws give consumers the right to challenge false positives in
their criminal background checks which, in at least one case, involved a consumer being denied employment because an individual with the same name had been convicted of a felony,
“even though that person shared nothing else in common . . . .” Megan Cerullo, What Everyone Should Know About Employer Background Checks, CBS NEWS (June 28, 2019, 3:23
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-job-candidates-should-know-about-employerbackground-checks/ [https://perma.cc/M33P-UWC8].
253 E.g., Riley, supra note 153 (recounting two instances of alleged misconduct: a driver arrested for attempting to break into a customer’s home after dropping the customer off at the
airport, and a driver accused of sexual assault).
254 Not surprisingly, the Department of Justice does not maintain a separate set of crime statistics for ride-sharing services. However, a regional transportation company in the Southeast
(and in competition with ride-sharing companies) maintained, for the years 2013 to 2016, a
blog cataloging “incidents” linked to Uber and Lyft. Our Blog: Reported List of Incidents
Involving Uber and Lyft, ATCHISON TRANSP. SERVS., https://www.atchisontransport.com/
blog/reported-list-of-incidents-involving-uber-and-lyft/ [https://perma.cc/WNS2-RKQQ]
(last visited Feb. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft]. From 2014
through 2016, fifteen deaths were listed, but nine were from automotive crashes, not crimes.
Id. The remaining 6 were from a single serial killer, but none of his crimes were committed
as an Uber driver. John Bacon, Uber Driver Arraigned on 6 Murder Counts: What We
Know, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/02/22/uber-driveraccused-killing-6-what-we-know/80725680/ [https://perma.cc/H24Y-4PBT] (last updated
Feb. 22, 2016, 2:56 PM). Sexual assault allegations were more common, with 114 reported
incidents. Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft, supra. While each of these events is horrifying,
they are relatively rare, given the millions of ride-share trips every year, see Arevalo, supra
note 119, particularly in comparison to overall crime rates in the U.S. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, there were 284,350 cases of rape or sexual assault in 2014, and
431,840 in 2015. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2015 2, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv15.pdf [https
://perma.cc/7BKV-DVZD] (last revised Mar. 22, 2018). While that number dropped to
298,410 in 2016, RACHEL E. MORGAN & GRACE KENA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2016: REVISED tbl.1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16re.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NEY7-GM4K], the numbers are still unconscionably high. Importantly for
the present discussion, however, is how miniscule the number of reported sexual assaults in
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One final set of criticisms is specific to the relationship between the rider
and the TNC, itself. These criticisms typically allege that riders are manipulated into using the TNC’s app255 or that TNCs are not properly safeguarding personal rider information.256 TNCs may have their own counter-explanations for
the offending phenomena, but the answer to critics is actually much simpler. In
brief, riders who feel manipulated—or who feel their privacy is violated—will
find alternative transportation, virtually guaranteeing that TNCs will be restrained in their desires to manipulate or exploit.
b. TNCs and Drivers
TNCs have also been accused of being unfair to the drivers who use their
apps, exploiting drivers’ relative lack of technological and legal sophistication.
One complaint on behalf of drivers is a common one in contract law—drivers
are not sophisticated enough to appreciate the import of all of the terms in their
contracts—augmented by the speed at which TNCs often require drivers using
their services to agree to modified terms.257 It is true that some drivers may not
have a level of sophistication equal to that of those drafting the initial contract
and the many and varied modifications, but that is not unique to TNC contracts.
Moreover, the argument that drivers will be confused by the rapid succession of
modifications258 ignores certain market realities that work in favor of the drivers. First of all, TNCs must have drivers who agree to use the software; TNCs
have no power to coerce any driver. Second, the world of the sharing economy
is one of rapid informational transfer, so that what one driver knows, others
will quickly discover, until that information is diffused throughout the pool of
potential drivers. Third, the TNC market is highly competitive, providing competing TNCs with strong incentives to discover and reveal any disadvantageous
and unnecessary contract terms. Put together, there is simply no reason to suspect that there are secret, “shadow terms”259 that drivers are not aware of, because those would be revealed by competitors and rapidly distributed to all existing and potential drivers.
Several specific concerns raised regarding TNC technology are troubling
as individual events but unconvincing as general critiques of the TNC model.
which a ride-sharing driver is the accused is, especially spread over four years, in which the
total number of sexual assaults would have been well over one million.
255 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1630 (describing reports that the Uber app shows
multiple available cars up to the point where the rider requests a ride, after which most of the
cars disappear and the rider is forced to wait).
256 Id. at 1647–48.
257 See id. at 1661.
258 Professor Oren Bar-Gill argues that this increasing complexity is intentional, designed to
gain an advantage over unsophisticated counter parties. OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY
CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 18–20, 141–45
(2012).
259 See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments,
57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 608–10 (2010).
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Uber requires drivers to wait five minutes for a rider to show up before cancelling without penalty, but some drivers complain that the app underestimates the
time spent waiting.260 Uber also requires drivers to accept a certain percentage
of ride requests, but some drivers complain that ride requests appear too rapidly
to accept.261 These occurrences are troubling as evidence of lingering transaction costs in an industry premised on the ability to reduce or eliminate transaction costs. However, they are quite limited in their frequency262 and are far
more likely to be the result of technological glitches than intentional abuse.263
Finally, it is possible that TNCs could facilitate racial or other forms of
discrimination by riders against drivers.264 Riders are not typically shown any
details about their driver prior to requesting a ride, so there is no opportunity to
discriminate at that point, but a bigoted rider might be tempted to cancel the
ride once more information about the driver is made available. Fortunately,
TNCs often charge a cancellation fee,265 which would impose a monetary cost
on that type of discriminatory behavior, but that would not curtail all forms of
discrimination. The easiest and most obvious mode would be for a bigoted rider
to intentionally and unfairly rate a driver lower because of the characteristic objected to by the bigot. Doing so would lower the overall rating of the driver and
put continued employment at risk.266
c.

TNCs and Society

Although all riders and drivers in the TNC system are subject to some costs
and risks, those risks are frequently and loudly proclaimed by TNC opponents
and those concerned with consumer safety. It is therefore difficult to imagine
that a significant number of riders or drivers are unaware of those potential
costs. As a result, riders’ and drivers’ using a TNC app reveals that the benefits

260

Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1631.
Id.
262 The latter complaint was categorized as “rare,” id. at 1631, and was drawn from a nonrepresentative sample of 400 interviews and comments on an online forum for drivers, the
participants in which were not screened. Id. at 1628–29 n.28 (describing the data-collection
methodology). The former complaint was categorized as being more common, but without
any indication of frequency. See id. at 1631.
263 Calo and Rosenblatt concede that “it can be challenging to dissect which part of the
problem is a business practice, a technical issue, or a sociotechnical misunderstanding[,]” id.
at 1660, but conclude that a TNC is “not necessarily absolve[d] . . . of fault under existing
law.” Id. at 1631 n.38. While true as a technical legal matter, the market realities make it
very difficult to imagine a company in a highly competitive and innovative market desiring
to abuse customers in this way or succeeding in the long run, even if they were so suicidal as
to abuse those who might provide them with revenues.
264 See Rosenblat et al., supra note 207, at 7.
265 E.g., Am I Charged for Cancelling?, UBER HELP, https://help.uber.com/riders/article/ami-charged-for-cancelling-an-uber-ride-?nodeId=5f6415dc-dfdb-4d64-927a-66bb06bc4f82 [ht
tps://perma.cc/BVV8-YWSS] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
266
Rosenblat et al., supra note 207, at 8.
261
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of ride-sharing outweigh the costs to the individuals that participate.267 That is
not the only consideration in any market analysis, however, as discussed supra,268 certain conditions may lead to inefficient markets, leading to suboptimal outcomes even though market participants believe that they are making
choices where benefits outweigh costs.
i.

Regulatory Avoidance

The first area where the operation of TNCs might raise concerns of suboptimal outcomes is in the grey area between regulated and non-regulated activity. TNCs operate within this grey area; they are not traditional point-topoint transportation providers, but they are involved in the point-to-point transportation industry. Into this grey area TNCs enter, beginning operations in a
municipal market without jumping through the hoops that would be required of
a new taxi driver or taxi company. Some scholars refer to this behavior as “regulatory entrepreneurship,”269 others more pejoratively as “regulatory arbitrage.”270 The difference between the two would appear that those in the former
camp view TNCs as merely seizing a profitable business opportunity while
those in the latter camp view TNCs as exploiting technical loopholes to gain a
profit at the expense of society and individuals. In both cases, however, there is
a presumption that ride-sharing is properly subject to regulation; TNCs enter
the picture with the intent of flouting the law for profit and doing so can be detrimental.
By entering the market without complying with important regulations, the
story goes, TNCs are more likely to impose costs on society. Operating outside
of a strict limit on taxis might increase congestion on city roads.271 Avoiding
health and safety regulations might put drivers and riders—and possibly innocent bystanders—at greater risk.272 Bypassing labor regulations might allow
267

Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Happiness and Revealed Preferences in Evolutionary Perspective, 33 VT. L. REV. 559, 561 (2009) (“[T]he most accurate guide to what people want lies
not in what they say, but what they do.”).
268
Supra Section I.D.
269 Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
383, 384–85 (2017).
270 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1645.
271 Congestion could increase if individuals used ride-sharing as a substitute for non-driving
trips (mass transit, walking, biking), but could decrease if ride-sharing reduces overall car
ownership. Lauren P. Alexander & Marta C. Gonzalez, Assessing the Impact of Real-Time
Ridesharing on Urban Traffic Using Mobile Phone Data, (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://userpages.umbc.edu/~nroy/courses/fall2018/cmisr/papers/Real-time-Ridesharing_
Alexander.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LYU-BURF]. But see Ziru Li et al., Do Ride-Sharing Services Affect Traffic Congestion? An Empirical Study of Uber Entry, SSRN 1, 11–13,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2838043 [https://perma.cc/5Y2A-UPM7] (last revised July 10,
2017) (finding evidence that Uber’s entry into the market correlates with decreases in congestion).
272
See LaFrance & Eveleth, supra note 247.
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TNCs to exploit drivers.273 In O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,274 for example, Uber drivers filed a class action lawsuit seeking a declaration that they
were employees of Uber, rather than independent contractors—as asserted by
Uber—so that they were entitled to protection under California labor law.275
If the view one takes of TNCs is that they are “essentially running a taxi
dispatch service for the smartphone age,”276 then it will be easy to draw the
conclusion that TNCs are flouting the law. There is an alternative way to view
the TNC business model, however, and that view changes the entire analysis. It
is that TNCs are merely providing access to software that allows individuals to
connect with each other, and that software has a per-use licensing fee. This story has some weaknesses, to be sure, since TNCs impose restrictions on who is
allowed to access their software, either as a driver or as a rider, but given the
strong reputational component of the TNC business model, restricting access is
fully consistent with the TNC-as-facilitator explanation.
How one views the tendency of innovators to avoid regulations likely depends on whether one views markets as largely beneficial or largely detrimental
to human flourishing. Under the first, regulation should be imposed only when
necessary to remedy market failures and, even then, only when government action will not result in even greater costs.277 Under the latter, regulation should
be imposed in order to minimize the harms—necessary though they may be—
that arise from market interactions. Antitrust laws, for example, are a form of
regulation that inhibits aggregation of market power, and market power can be
used to exploit consumers or to create efficiencies that can lead to lower prices
for consumers.278 If one views markets as largely beneficial, then antitrust
should step in only when it can be shown that consumers will be adversely affected, preferably after imposing a high evidentiary burden.279 Alternatively, if
one believes markets are largely detrimental, then antitrust authorities should
actively police all actions that lead to increased market power.
Most commentators, scholars, and politicians will fall somewhere between
these two extremes, which can obscure the importance of the underlying principles. When markets are viewed favorably, that which is not prohibited will be
permitted. Under a regime of that sort, the innovative TNC technology and
business model should be free to operate in any market it chooses, subject to
the potential government regulation of its activities if those activities prove
273

See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1646.
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
275 Id. at 1135.
276 Pollman & Barry, supra note 269, at 385.
277 See, e.g., ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR
COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 1–2 (2016).
278 See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 559–
62 (2012).
279 E.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J.
527, 546–47 (2013) (describing the rule of reason standard).
274
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harmful. When markets are viewed skeptically, however, all that is not permitted will be prohibited, to a greater or lesser extent, and a TNC that enters a
market without permission will be acting in a lawless fashion.280
Moreover, there are many regulations that might be viewed as ineffective
or bad policy choices281 and others that are actively harmful, not only from an
efficiency standpoint but also from a safety standpoint.282 Removing those regulations would be beneficial to individuals, regulated entities, and society, as a
whole, so the ultimate outcome of the change could be cheered. Indeed, one of
the primary complaints regarding TNCs is that they are competing unfairly because they are not subject to the same regulations as taxi companies.283 If the
regulations are not necessary for market efficiency, consumer protection, or
safety, however, the proper action would be to remove the regulatory burden
from taxis rather than impose the unnecessary burden on TNCs.284 The concern
about regulatory avoidance is, at some level, a distraction because it paints regulations with a broad brush, assuming validity. A more useful and appropriate
analysis would, instead, concern itself with specific regulations, to determine
whether they are needed or whether they serve the interests of industry incumbents.

280

Kidd, supra note 8, at 179–80. This path imposes significant costs on society, not least of
which is lower innovation, as entrepreneurs are either forced into the grey market or driven
out of the market entirely. Id.
281 In the wake of the Enron scandal, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which,
among other things, mandated that corporations establish independent audit committees,
even though a consensus existed that such a mandate would have no impact. See, e.g., Sanjai
Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 942–44 (1999) (summarizing the consensus in the literature on board independence and firm performance); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005)
(“[I]ndependent boards do not improve performance and . . . boards with too many outsiders
may, in fact, have a negative impact on performance.”). Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act,
passed in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–08, contained numerous provisions that
were known to have effectively zero chance of achieving any of the bill’s stated goals. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783 (2011).
282 Bainbridge, supra note 281, at 1783, 1797–1815 (concluding that some of Dodd-Frank’s
corporate governance provisions are likely to have adverse consequences); Kidd, supra note
47, at 18 (concluding that federal trucking regulations, designed to increase safety by mandating rest periods, inevitably lead to big trucks being on the road at the busiest times of the
day). A sizeable percentage of regulations—in addition to whatever benefits they might confer on society—serve to entrench industry incumbents. Kidd, supra note 8, at 180; Kidd, supra note 93, at 371, 441–43 (describing how hedge fund regulation under Dodd-Frank entrenches traditional financial institutions). Those incumbents not only gain additional
monopoly rents, supra, Part II, but also have weaker incentives to consider consumer safety,
amelioration of negative externalities, and so on, due to the lack of competitive pressures.
283 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1626.
284 While “misery loves company” is a popular proverb, it should not motivate public policy.
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There is, however, something disconcerting and troubling about the process described by TNC opponents—a company openly flaunting the rules285 in
such a way as to generate support among the population, effectively forcing
regulators to make a change. One might argue that this has more than a whiff of
abusing the rule of law.286 And yet, if all that is happening is that TNCs avoid
regulation because regulators feel compelled to follow the will of the public,
democratic norms might support TNCs’ “entrepreneurship.” By entering a
market that does not currently regulate their innovative business model,287
TNCs can demonstrate that, by reducing transaction costs, the point-to-point
transportation market can function without heavy regulation. Whether regulators see the value in that argument or are merely cowed into adopting a deregulatory posture, the first—and most important—question is whether the market
is functioning efficiently, sans regulation, not why regulators have chosen not
to intervene.
There are simply too many flaws with the regulatory-avoidance critique of
TNCs for it to be a significant counterbalance to the benefits of ride-sharing.
Within the critique, it is typically assumed, rather than proven, that existing
regulations apply, in the first place, or that they are beneficial. Innovation will
end up being broadly stifled if every innovator must abide by the regulations
that govern what the innovation replaces. More importantly, the popularity of
TNCs among both riders and drivers is strong evidence that the regulations do
not provide a net benefit. Instead of banging a drum for TNCs to face archaic,
badly designed regulations, policy makers should clear the field of those regulations that have long inhibited other participants in the point-to-point transportation market, like taxis and limos.
ii. Information Asymmetries
Some commentators are increasingly concerned with information asymmetries in the age of big data, including its application to the sharing economy.
285

Critics are fond of citing the “Greyball” scandal, where Uber sent images of nonexistent
cars and drivers to certain users. Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyballprogram-evade-authorities.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/ZXL2-Z9QB].
This practice is derided as an attempt to avoid enforcement officials, and those officials did
receive the fake images. Id. Uber justified the practice by saying that it was attempting to foil
individuals who were attempting to fraudulently use the app. Id. Municipal officials who are
not looking for a ride would look suspiciously like other types of fraudulent riders, so Uber’s
explanation is plausible. More importantly, if Uber is not properly subject to taxi regulations,
then Uber’s efforts are nothing more than a legitimate attempt to avoid abusive tactics by
overzealous government agents.
286 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1640.
287 Importantly, Pollman and Barry define regulatory entrepreneurship in terms of whether
there is “significant uncertainty” about whether regulations apply. Pollman & Barry, supra
note 269, at 392. In markets where this is the case, it is unclear why the unquestioned default
should be that the regulations do apply.
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This “foundational critique”288 arises from the concern that big data will allow
TNCs and other sharing economy companies to “extract[] more and more value
from participants,”289 diminishing any value they might bring to consumers
with their innovations. These concerns are both independent of290 and more serious than those discussed supra, because they go to the heart of whether a
point-to-point transportation market can function properly without government
regulation.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that this is not a traditional
economic argument about information asymmetries, which typically take the
form of adverse selection,291 moral hazard,292 or principal-agent problems.293 In
each of these examples, markets break down because the price mechanism does
not work properly when information is withheld from the market.294 In a classic
case of adverse selection, for example, buyers of used cars do not have good
information about the quality of cars being offered.295 Only the sellers have that
information—therein lies the asymmetry—and buyers will discount their offering price in order to account for the probability that the car they are considering
is a “lemon.”296 Sellers of higher-quality used cars will be unwilling to accept
the lower price, leading to a worsening of quality in the used car market.297
Buyers will further lower the price they offer, driving the best remaining cars
out of the market, and so on, until only the worst cars are left.298 Again, the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers causes the market to break
down, which is the defining characteristic of a market failure.299
288

Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1649.
Id. at 1627–28.
290 Id. at 1649.
291 See Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 746 (2012)
(“[A]dverse selection is really a problem of information asymmetry: the insured presumably
knows more about his own riskiness than the insurer.”).
292 See Christopher D. Dodge, Note, Doomed to Repeat: Why Sequestration and the Budget
Control Act of 2011 are Unlikely to Solve Our Solvency Woes, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 835, 875 (2012) (“Moral hazard often arises in cases where there is an information
asymmetry . . . as the principal cannot adequately monitor the actions of [his or her] agent.”).
293 See Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 185, 210 (2014) (“One way to address the problem might be to adopt institutional
reforms that ameliorate the underlying principal-agent problem, for example by reducing the
information asymmetry between principals and agents.”).
294 Cf. Market Failures, LIB. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/
HighSchool/MarketFailures.html [https://perma.cc/69H4-6VFW] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
295 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
296 Id.
297 Id. at 490–91.
298 Id. at 490.
299 A similar situation often arises in health insurance markets, where community rating precludes consideration of all relevant characteristics of the potential insureds. A price—the
premium—is set based on the average risk of the pool of insureds, but those with the lowest
risk will often be unwilling to pay the premium, so the average risk will rise, premiums will
289
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The type of information asymmetry that is concerning to TNC critics is
something else, entirely. In the TNC market, riders and drivers are connected
by TNC software, and that software has the ability to track both groups and
gather significant amounts of data about them.300 TNC critics are concerned
that this gives TNCs a strong informational advantage over riders and drivers,
which could lead to exploitation.301 While certainly a legitimate potential concern, this is not an argument about information asymmetry—which has a wellunderstood technical meaning in economics—and it is improper to mislead
readers in this way.
Having said that, critics’ real arguments about exploitation of consumers
and producers in the sharing economy deserve a fair hearing, as it is perfectly
reasonable to argue that big businesses seek to exert market power or informational advantages to increase their profits. In addressing critics’ exploitation
concerns, it is important to keep in mind the insights of Adam Smith, whose
writings in 1759302 and 1776303 still hold tremendous insights about human nature,304 as well as those of John Kenneth Galbraith, whose influential work, The
Affluent Society,305 continues to fuel suspicion of capitalism and the innovation
it generates.
Adam Smith’s insights into human nature are the foundation of modern
economics,306 but they are often misunderstood, even by modern economists.307
rise, and more low-risk individuals will drop out. Eventually, only those with high risk will
be left in the insurance pool. Id. at 492–94.
300 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1652.
301 See id. at 1651.
302 E.g., THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 214, at xxv.
303 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 151.
304 Contrary to the caricature of economic modelling offered by proponents of behavioral
law and economics, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1650, Smith did not presume
absolute rationality by individuals. In Theory of Moral Sentiments, for example, he proposed
that individuals have a desire both “to be loved, [and] to be lovely,” THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS, supra note 214, at 132, which opens the door for much that would appear irrational under a strict homo economicus model. E.g., Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: The
Ethology of Homo Economicus, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 221, 223, 230 (1995). Moreover,
his much-remarked discussion of the “invisible hand” just pointed out that selfish motives
can yield tremendous benefits to others, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 151, at 351–52
(“[E]very individual . . . neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much
he is promoting it. . . . [H]e is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to
promote an end which was no part of his intention.”), something that is often ignored in critiques of capitalism, as if the desire for self-enrichment was inherently opposed to the welfare of others.
305 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (3d ed., rev. 1976).
306 Adam Smith is widely considered the “father of modern economics.” See, e.g., Ugo
Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido Calabresi, 64
MD. L. REV. 220, 232 (2005); Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619,
628 n.28 (2006); Alice M. Thomas, Re-Envisioning the Charitable Deduction to Legislate
Compassion and Civility: Reclaiming Our Collective and Individual Humanity Through Sustained Volunteerism, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 269, 284 (2010).
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At the risk of gross over-simplification, Smith first argued that individuals are
complicated, motivated by a desire not only to be thought a good person, worthy of praise, but also to actually be a good person, worthy of praise.308 Only
later, when answering the question of why some countries became wealthy
while others struggled, did he offer the insights that have since been caricatured—that individuals motivated by self-interest regularly benefit those around
them.309 In a Smithian view of the world, each individual strives to be a praiseworthy person while they seek to meet their material needs. In a free market,
individuals can specialize, allowing them to be praise-worthy by meeting the
needs of others, who then provide compensation.310
Understanding how markets function, in Smithian terms, requires understanding that they are merely the aggregation of millions or billions of individual transactions—in short, markets are all of us, going about the business of
making our individual lives better.311 Some poor formulations insist that individuals need to be perfectly informed about their decisions, or that individuals
do not make mistakes.312 Not only are these assumptions demonstrably false,
but they are unnecessary to explain Smith’s understanding of markets. All that
is needed is individuals’ planning for their own lives—mistakes and all—rather
than insisting on planning on a societal level.313 As a result of voluntary transactions by trillions of individuals,314 prices emerge, motivating further individual responses, as described supra.315

307

E.g., infra, note 329–30 and accompanying text.
THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 214, at 133 (“The most sincere praise can
give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praiseworthiness.”). Smith acknowledges that this motivation exists in greater or lesser degree in
each individual, e.g., id. at 136 (“It is only the weakest and most superficial of mankind who
can be much delighted with that praise which they themselves know to be altogether unmerited.”), including those who seem not to be motivated by the desire “to be loved, [and] to be
lovely,” but it is a dominant factor in many, if not all, human decisions. Id. at 132.
309 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 151, at 20 (“It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest.”).
310 See id. at 19–23 (describing the importance of expanding markets to specialization, division of labor, and the ability of individuals to improve their lot by “truck, barter, and exchange [of] one thing for another.”).
311 See Kidd, supra note 8, at 188.
312 E.g., F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 523 (1945)
(critiquing the trend in economics to presume that production decisions are easily and routinely made); Padis, supra note 79, at 100 (“The argument . . . relies on the assumption of
perfect information. The reality is that (sadly for economists) we do not live in a world of
perfect information.”).
313 Hayek, supra note 73, at 78–79.
314 For a helpful example of how many decisions go into the simplest production process,
see READ, supra note 34, at 5–7.
315
Supra Section I.A.2.
308
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In contrast, a Galbraithian view of the world sees individuals as inherently
corruptible, easily led astray by savvy marketing schemes.316 Individuals are
not made better by having additional things to buy but are only convinced that
they are better off because those who have invented new things have fooled
consumers into thinking their lives are better.317 Instead of allowing continued
investment in consumer research or innovation, government should regulate
with the goal of maintaining a stable consumption regime and direct all excess
income to spending on public goods, like libraries, museums, and so on.318 The
weakness of the Galbraithian perspective is demonstrated in the fact that The
Affluent Society was published in 1952, and individuals and society have been
made immeasurably better off by the advent of innovations since then.319
Moreover, it is difficult to honestly claim that future innovations—cheap solar
power, automated and electric cars, and quantum computing—will also fail to
make individuals’ lives better.
At its core, the exploitation critique offered by opponents of the sharing
economy is Galbraithian. Take one criticism of TNCs: that they are engaged in
“self-dealing.”320 Read in its most broad form, this is absolutely correct and also perfectly unhelpful, because every market participant is engaged in meeting
its own material needs. As described by Smith, this is a good thing because that
self-dealing, in a market context, is possible only to the extent that TNCs meet
the needs of consumers. To the Galbraithian critic, self-dealing is a pejorative;
to the Smithian, it is a positive statement about the expected behavior of all
market participants. In the context of a legal analysis, the term is likely intended to invoke negative reactions based on perceived breaches of fiduciary duty,321 but this language is manipulative, since a TNC owes no fiduciary duties
to a rider or a driver.
316

See GALBRAITH, supra note 305, at 129 (“[The] central function [of modern advertising
and salesmanship] is to create desires—to bring into being wants that previously did not exist.”), 198 (“[G]iven that consumer wants are created by the process by which they are satisfied—the consumer makes no such choice. He [or she] is subject to the forces of advertising
and emulation by which production creates its own demand.”).
317 Id. at 131 (“[I]t can no longer be assumed that welfare is greater at an all-round higher
level of production than at a lower one. It may be the same.”), 232 (“To create the demand
for new automobiles, we must contrive elaborate and functionless changes each year and
then subject the consumer to ruthless psychological pressures to persuade him [or her] of
their importance.”).
318 See id. at 235 (“The solution is a system of taxation which automatically makes a pro
rata share of increasing income available to public authority for public purposes.”).
319 Galbraith offered minimal revisions to the foundational claim of the book as he revised it
for new editions over the years. The language of the book makes clear he believed that the
U.S. had reached peak utility in the 1950s. Less clear is whether he had revised his estimation with each new edition—establishing as the new baseline for sufficient affluence at 1969,
then 1976, then 1998—or whether he still believed that 1958 was the time when peak affluence was achieved.
320 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1649.
321 “Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter
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Galbraithian thought pervades much of the critical analysis of TNCs, largely based on a concern that TNCs will exploit consumers by using large amounts
of consumer data to determine what will make riders more likely to use their
software.322 To a Galbraithian, this sounds like exploitation of consumer gullibility; to a Smithian, this sounds like a company seeking to discover and provide something that more closely matches the consumer’s exact preferences. To
take but one example, TNC opponents worry that TNCs have discovered that
individuals are likely willing to pay more for a ride when their phone battery is
low.323 To a Smithian, this is hardly surprising, since modern consumers know
that they have more transportation options as long as their phone is working; as
the phone threatens to cease working, those options fade, and the consumer
faces the real prospect of having no transportation, at all. How can it be surprising that a consumer, faced with that scenario, would be willing to pay a premium to avoid the risk that comes from reduced transportation options?
Critics also complain that TNCs will be able to exploit cognitive biases,
perhaps leading to overconsumption of TNC services.324 While it is certainly
true that each TNC would like consumers to use its software more frequently, it
is not clear how anyone would know whether a rider is consuming too many
TNC rides or why that would continue indefinitely. It is certainly true that some
research has shown the existence of cognitive biases, such as believing that
$9.99 is closer to $9.00 than to $10.00.325 But would this bias result in riders
hiring a driver to take them somewhere they do not wish to go? More importantly, a rider who pays $9.99 for a ride is still: (1) marginally better off
than someone who paid $10.00 for a ride,326 and (2) $9.99 poorer and one ride
richer. Over time, budget constraints are binding, pennies add up, and riders
will learn exactly how much they can spend on ride-sharing without adversely
impacting their other consumption choices. In the long run, even cognitive bithan the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928). Whether in a partnership or corporation, or in a trustee relationship, those with
fiduciary duties are in a special relationship of trust and are held to a higher standard. See id.
322 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1654–59. Going by the name of “digital market
manipulation,” Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1002–
03 (2014), the argument is that, by knowing so much about each user, TNCs can trick them
into doing things they wouldn’t otherwise because they have teased out of the data patterns
that reveal individual user idiosyncrasies. Id. Interestingly, this is not secret information
known only to the TNC, but information that is individually available to each rider and driver. The TNC does not generate this information, but merely aggregates it in a useful form.
This aggregation is one of the primary benefits of our digital age, because we are largely unable to identify patterns in our own preferences but, through aggregation of our data, a TNC
can anticipate what we will want, perhaps even better than we can. Id. at 1003.
323 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1630. It is never described exactly how TNCs would
be able to discern the phone’s battery level.
324 Id. at 1628.
325 See John D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 739–42 (1999).
326
A penny saved is a penny earned.
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ases will be overcome because individual budget constraints will impose a discipline stronger than biases.
On a broader scale, critics complain that TNCs will be able to manipulate
the market with their control over both riders and drivers.327 This concern fundamentally misunderstands markets, in that the market is not a machine with
buttons and levers that can be pushed. Rather, it is effectively a complex organism that resists manipulation, except for the type of manipulation Smith envisioned, providing something the individuals want to purchase so that they will
hand over their money. Only in a Galbraithian world are individuals—riders
and drivers—susceptible to the type of manipulation that would give TNCs any
market power beyond what is voluntarily given them by consumers who wish
to use their products. Coincidentally, it is precisely this type of Galbraithian
concern over manipulation that leads to government regulation, erecting barriers to entry that give incumbents market power and enabling them to do, postregulation, what they could not achieve in its absence.328
In the end, Galbraithian critics of TNCs fear the future and what it might
hold. The future is always uncertain and, therefore, inherently risky, so it is understandable that it induces fear in many people. The type of risks that bother
TNC critics, however, are a parade of horribles, possible only in a world without competition or the Smithian human desire to be lovely. One of the most
palpable examples of this is the claim that TNCs might be able to identify when
individuals are depressed and use it to extract greater profits.329 It is possible
that one or more TNCs might be led by greed-obsessed individuals, and those
individuals might have a strong desire to exploit, manipulate, and otherwise
bleed dry TNC riders, even depressed ones. In a competitive market, however,
it would take only one “good” company to buck the “evil” trend and loudly
proclaim to the riding public how they were being taken advantage of by the
other TNCs. The evil TNCs would be forever ruined, and consumer-friendly
business practices would once again be restored.
3. Will Regulation Help?
Even if the parade of horribles imagined by TNC critics were realistic, it
would still bear asking whether the proposed solutions—typically disclosure,
disclosure, and more disclosure330—would make any meaningful difference.
Disclosures made to consumers can have some positive impacts,331 but the gov327

See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1652.
See Kidd, supra note 8, at 172.
329 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1651.
330 See, e.g., id., at 1633 (demanding more “granular” data from TNCs).
331
As a general matter, then, product sellers have an incentive not to disclose riskrelated information that would reduce consumer estimates of the product’s net benefit.
But why do consumers not acquire this information on their own? The reason is simple: If information were free, everyone would be perfectly informed about everything,
making questions of disclosure irrelevant. Information about product risks, however,
328
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ernment may be bad at determining what information will actually be helpful to
users of TNC software,332 including that users may not be sophisticated enough
to make use of the information.333 Even worse are mandates of disclosures to
the government, which are often merely a way to increase the cost to new competitors, increasing the market power of industry incumbents.334 Even if not intended to serve that purpose, disclosures alone appear little more than a concession that regulators are ignorant of any real risks but believe that, given enough
time and data, a regulatory “solution” to an as-yet-identified problem will
emerge. At best, regulations of this sort are unnecessary costs that burden innovation; at worst, they are intentional barriers to entry, designed to give current
industry incumbents protection against competition.
Whether the government “solution” is outright barriers to entry or indirect
barriers through regulation, a movement away from a free market is likely to
benefit someone. Given the market power and corresponding monopoly rents
generated by existing taxi regulations, the incentives are strong for those groups
that gain from the present system to engage in what public choice economists
call “rent-seeking” to maintain the system. That is not to say that opposition to
ride-sharing is motivated by bad faith. To the contrary, there are many who
hold sincere beliefs that the risks of innovation in this area are too great to
leave without regulation. However, as described herein, those concerns are
largely hypothetical and improbable, while the benefits are real and tangible,
making opposition counter majoritarian.
IV. INNOVATION UBER ALLEGORY
What can ride-sharing teach us about the sharing economy, innovation, and
how the law should react in the face of significant disruption? As a preliminary
matter, the entire history of the taxi industry is characterized by protectionism.
What is more, that protectionism came about because of an apparent attempt to
correct a perceived market failure. Whether that attempt was sincere but misguided or the result of bootlegger pressures to create a pool of monopoly rents,
it fails a Coaseian analysis because it failed to focus on transaction costs and
their role in creating the market imperfection. Then, as now, there is much
is often costly to obtain. Moreover, given the low level of risk posed by most products
and the widespread lack of consumer knowledge about the risk, any given individual
often will find the benefits of acquiring the information about any one product are not
worth the costs. Thus, unless product sellers disclose risk-related information, consumers are not likely to have such information available to them when they make decisions about the purchase and use of products.
Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
309, 318 (1997).
332 One need only consider how often the small print in bank disclosures and credit card disclosures are actually read by consumers—almost never—to know that government mandates
of disclosure do not mean that the information will be helpful.
333 See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1310 (2017).
334
E.g., Kidd, supra note 93, at 436.
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noise about needing to do something but little attention paid to whether letting
the technologies settle in and generate further innovation might lead to lower
transaction costs and, eventually, elimination of the market imperfection. While
it is impossible to know what an alternative timeline would have looked like, it
is at least plausible that, had municipal governments withheld their regulatory
powers, perceived imperfections in point-to-point transportation markets would
have resolved themselves organically, obviating the need for expensive and distortionary government interventions.
LESSON #1: PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE, EVEN WHEN REGULATING

It is unlikely that we will ever again inhabit a world with slow, methodical
innovation, so formal and informal rules will need to adapt to the new reality of
accelerated innovation. Lesson #1 may be counter-intuitive, that increasing innovation should call for more patience—certainly our regulatory speed must
keep pace—but making decisions based on short-term data could be disastrous.
Rather than react out of fear of market failures, resulting in longer-lasting government failures, we should remember that today’s ill-conceived regulation
could be tomorrow’s transaction cost, and adopt an attitude of regulatory humility. The remainder of this Part will identify other “life lessons” from our recent history with TNCs and the taxi industry that can help lawmakers and regulators protect consumers while preserving consumer choice and the market
discipline that results.
TNCs, like many modern innovators, do not just enter an existing market.
Instead, they often create an entirely new one, often by reducing transaction
costs in a way that allows entirely new connections between potential buyers
and sellers.335 Many critics miss this important distinction and accuse innovators of intentionally and wrongfully violating existing regulatory regimes by
operating without permission. This criticism is founded upon the assumption
that all that is not expressly permitted is prohibited, an assumption that would
stymie innovation and limit human flourishing. This criticism also mistakes the
very nature of innovation and does so, interestingly enough, by underestimating
the importance of what has been accomplished. Rather than modify, innovators
often create an entirely new thing and do so completely outside the regulated
sphere. What the innovators have done is, of course, detrimental to entrenched
incumbents but very beneficial to consumers, who can obtain goods and services—transportation services in the case of TNCs—more cheaply and, given
the increase in competition, likely with far better quality.336

335

MUNGER, supra note 79, at 85–86.
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING PLATFORMS,
PARTICIPANTS & REGULATORS 1 (Nov. 2016) (“[Firms in the sharing economy] have brought
substantial benefits to consumers and suppliers alike, while challenging incumbents who
have traditionally served those sectors.”), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
336
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LESSON #2: JUST BECAUSE IT EXISTS DOES NOT MEAN IT IS (OR SHOULD BE)
REGULATED

More important, from a legal standpoint, is precisely why innovators create
entirely new areas of economic activity beyond the bounds of existing regulation. In a competitive market with low barriers to entry, innovation would happen on a continuous basis, with every market participant seeking new ways of
pleasing consumers, so as to generate higher profits. Under those market circumstances, consumers continually enjoy improvements in the goods and services that they buy, and producers are rarely able to collect more than normal
market profits, so consumers pay the lowest price possible. Markets that function in this way experience a smooth evolutionary process, always improving
but rarely in a disruptive way.
In a market with high barriers to entry, disruption is far more likely because those barriers stymie the smooth evolution brought on by continuous innovation. In a market with high entry barriers, innovation is largely unnecessary because internal competition is minimal, at best, and no external
competition is allowed. At least, no competition is allowed using the traditional
methods of the industry being protected. No one from the outside can develop a
mode of transportation that looks like a taxi service, for example, because regulators would easily recognize that for what it is, swoop in, and exclude the innovations as counter to the regulatory regime. It is only when innovation occurs
so far outside of the regulated sphere that it may avoid the attention of regulators long enough to gain a foothold and flourish. Innovation that arrives in this
fashion will bypass existing regulations and create chaos among existing market participants, and it is the barriers to entry that guarantee greater disruption.
LESSON #3: HIGH ENTRY BARRIERS DELAY INNOVATION, BUT INCREASE THE LEVEL OF
INEVITABLE DISRUPTION

TNCs, like other innovators, also have the capacity to break through the
transitional gains trap. Recall that the trap exists because those obtaining benefits from the barriers to entry will not voluntarily relinquish their protected position, and because legislative and/or regulatory solutions are intractable. TNCs
operate in an unregulated space and, as such, are able to begin operations outside the restrictions on the taxi industry. The facilitation function of TNCs
leads to corresponding increases in both the supply of ride-share drivers and the
demand for ride-sharing. In other words, by reducing transaction costs, TNCs
have allowed an unregulated market for point-to-point transportation to flourish. Regulators eventually caught on that there was a form of transportation not
covered by the regulations, and a backlash occurred, but consumers had already

reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators-federal-tradecommission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7Y4-LU7K]; see also Koopman et al., supra note 210, at 531–32.
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developed an affinity for ride-sharing, making regulation politically infeasible
in most—though not all—cities.337
LESSON #4: INNOVATION, IF NOT INHIBITED, CAN DIMINISH THE POWER OF SPECIAL
INTERESTS

One relevant critique of this research is that there is no evidence of bootleggers at work. While the theoretical foundations are solid, it is true that there
is minimal empirical evidence to support the theory. The primary reason for
that is the lack of reliable data on market penetration by TNCs, ideally in number of TNC drivers per capita.338 Given the constant threat of litigation faced by
TNCs,339 it is understandable that they would be reluctant to share operational
data like the number of Uber drivers for given cities, but that reluctance makes
empirical work in this area very difficult. However, there is hope for the future
of research in this area. First, even the limited existing data provides glimpses
of possible evidence that bootleggers are active.
For example, using a limited sample of Uber drivers available publicly,340
it is possible to compare seventeen of the top fifty cities by population, across a
number of variables, including Uber drivers per capita. New York City provides an intriguing case study, as compared to the larger sample. With a very
high population density (nearly six times the average of seventeen major cities),341 the need for point-to-point transportation should be exceptionally high.
Even with a much more elaborate subway system, New York City does have a
higher than average number of taxis per capita, but at less than twice the aver-

337

A similar event occurred in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries in Cologne, where
brewing was tightly controlled within city limits but not in the countryside, and innovation in
the unregulated territory broke the transitional gains trap. See Diana W. Thomas, Deregulation Despite Transitional Gains: The Brewers Guild of Cologne 1461, 140 PUB. CHOICE 329,
332, 332, 336–37 (2009).
338 It is possible that cultural factors might mean a lower level of interest in being a driver
for hire in a particular community, but it is difficult to imagine what cultural norms might be,
so it is reasonably safe to assume that most large cities will have equivalent numbers of forhire drivers using TNC technology. Moreover, controlling for the relative prevalence of taxis
within a city should minimize this source of potential bias in the results.
339 One legal case, filed against two of Uber’s founders, Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp,
alleges that they should be personally liable for damages arising out of a misclassification of
Uber drivers as independent contractors, rather than employees. Complaint at 2–3, James v.
Kalanick, (Super. Ct. Cal., L.A. Cty. June 22, 2017) (No. BC666055). This follows another
class action, filed against Uber Technologies, Inc., alleging harms from misclassification.
Complaint at 2, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (No. C-13-3826
EMC), 2015 WL 5130897. The California Labor Commissioner has already ruled that drivers using Uber’s technology are employees under California law, rather than independent
contractors. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., Case No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *4,
*6 (Cal. Dept. Lab. Order, Decision or Award, June 3, 2015).
340 E.g., Hall & Krueger, supra note 208, at 5–6.
341 Data on population density was obtained from the United States Census datasets, census.gov. Data on file with author.
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age of these seventeen cities.342 These results would seem to indicate a significant amount of pent-up demand for transportation services, presenting an ideal
opportunity for TNCs, yet the number of Uber drivers per capita is less than
one-fourth the average of the sample of large cities.343 Some of this may be that
New York also has a significantly lower per household income, after adjusting
for cost of living,344 so New York residents simply cannot afford to hire a TNC
driver. However, New York also exhibits much higher influence of the financial sector on the local economy,345 so financiers might be exercising their influence to protect their investments.
The second reason to hope is the development of proxies for TNC market
penetration,346 which will allow greater understanding of the impacts of TNC
operations nationally and globally. It will also allow for a more detailed analysis of bootlegger activity that could, in turn, encourage greater skepticism about
who truly benefits from regulatory barriers.
LESSON #5: SEEK FIRST TO UNDERSTAND, THEN SEEK TO REGULATE

This last lesson is essential to follow in a political age where every election
is the “most important election of our lifetime.”347 There will always be a
strong incentive for lawmakers and regulators to address problems as they
arise, yet today’s ill-conceived regulation is tomorrow’s transaction cost, and
crises can be used by bootleggers to motivate regulation that has not been narrowly tailored to the perceived problem. More importantly, bootleggers will try
very hard to create the perception of problems when doing so could lead to barriers to entry and additional exploitation of consumers. Waiting to adopt new
342

Data on taxi numbers were gathered from a variety of municipal and industry sources.
Data on file with author.
343 The author requested and obtained Uber data from internal Uber sources, as it was used
to generate Figure 3 in Hall & Krueger, supra note 208, at 15, fig.3. Data on file with author.
344 Household income data was obtained from census.gov, adjusted according to bankrate.com’s cost of living calculator. Data on file with author.
345 Data was gathered from U.S. Census sources on the percentage of local jobs and local
payrolls accounted for by various subcategories of the financial sector. Data on file with author; see also James Orr, How Important Is the Finance Sector to the New York City Economy?, ECON. STUD. GROUP (June 9, 2017), https://esg.gc.cuny.edu/2017/06/09/howimportant-is-the-finance-sector-to-the-new-york-city-economy/ [https://perma.cc/79X29APR].
346 See Jonathan D. Hall et al., Is Uber a Substitute or Complement for Public Transit?, 108
J. URB. ECON. 36, 38 (2018).
347 E.g., Michael Brenes, Why 2018 May Be The Most Important Election Of Our Lifetime,
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11
/05/why-may-be-most-important-election-our-lifetime/?utm_term=.dd150bd2083f
[https://perma.cc/3652-Q9A3] (internal quotation marks omitted); David Corn, The Most
Important Election of Our Lives, MOTHER JONES (Nov./Dec. 2018), https://www.mo
therjones.com/politics/2018/10/the-most-important-election-of-our-lives-1/ [https://
perma.cc/5DVN-5KK4]; Franklin Graham, Why This Is the Most Important Election of Our
Lifetime, DECISION MAG. (Oct. 29, 2018), https://decisionmagazine.com/why-this-is-themost-important-election-of-our-lifetime/ [https://perma.cc/KMY6-Q7HG].
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“solutions” will always be difficult for politicians, but a true concern for consumer welfare requires it, especially when the perceived harms are highly speculative and remote.
CONCLUSION
The world we live in is changing and at an ever-increasing rate. One could
just as easily thwart the passing of the Mississippi River as thwart the innovative forces that have been unleashed on the world. Those forces come with disruption in their wake, but the ways that the law responds to innovation can minimize the size and duration of the harm caused by those disruptions. Choosing
the right approach to innovation and its disruptions requires understanding innovation and the ways that the various affected groups will react. For example,
it is understandable that those who benefit from the status quo will oppose any
change that disrupts their ability to collect monopoly rents, but disruption of
those rents is a disruption in favor of consumers, who have been exploited under any regime that bestows monopoly power on any individual or group.
A century ago, taxis changed the world as they emerged to satisfy a need
for point-to-point transportation in increasingly population-dense cities, where
the cost of owning a personal vehicle was skyrocketing. Today, TNCs and their
transaction-cost-reducing technologies are changing the world in ways that disrupt the established and entrenched taxi industry, and that industry is pushing
back. A collection of taxi drivers, taxi companies, taxi commissions, and financial institutions that hold taxi-industry debt all have strong incentives to oppose
change that threatens to diminish the monopoly rents currently being collected,
but by doing so, they are perpetuating needless exploitation of consumers who
have few transportation alternatives.
Sharing economy technology not only reduces transaction costs but allows
innovation outside of the currently regulated sphere of activity. By doing so, it
offers a real chance to break the transitional gains trap and frees both drivers
and riders from the grasp of the taxi monopoly. When the entrenched incumbents refuse to surrender their ill-gotten gains, the fight is on. Because protection of consumer-exploiting monopoly rents is hardly the foundation for a winning marketing campaign, entrenched incumbents enlist assistance from
academic Baptists, and many are willing to step forward and lend their aid. Unconvincing arguments about consumer safety have failed to convince consumers to ignore their real-life experience with the sharing economy, so opponents
of change have adopted a Galbraithian view of human nature, cynically arguing
that sharing economy technology and the corresponding market processes that
accompany it will result in manipulation. This view differs dramatically from
that of Adam Smith, who viewed individuals as social creatures, seeking the
welfare of others as its own laudable goal, but also because it allowed individuals to benefit themselves.
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This Article pushes back against the moralizing of Galbraithian Baptists
and counsels caution before making the same mistakes that were made in the
early days of the taxi industry. Rather than accept the impassioned pleas of the
Baptists and hand monopoly power back to the entrenched incumbents who
have—and will continue to—exploit consumers, lawmakers should respond to
innovation with a Smithian faith in humanity and its ability to flourish, if allowed to seek new and exciting solutions to our current problems. Lawmakers
should also heed the warnings of Ronald Coase, that transaction costs are key,
and that government interventions that do not reduce transaction costs will inevitably lead to greater stagnation. That stagnation, in turn, will only delay and
amplify the inevitable disruption.

